DEVINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On 15/2/2002 the State of Punjab issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The said acquisition was for a public purpose, namely for setting up of Ganesha Project of M/s International Tractors Limited. The notification was published in the newspapers on 9/2/2002. Objections were invited from the interested persons and the petitioners submitted their objections which are on record.

(2.) The petitioners were heard and thereafter on 28.2.2003 the State issued a notification under Section 6 of the Act. The petitioners in all these writ petitions have challenged these notifications primarily on the ground that the State had resorted to the acquisition under the provisions of Part VII of the Act and that this was not an acquisition which was covered by Part II of the Act. The acquisition was being made for a company which was interested in profiteering and there was no public purpose involved. Further it was stated that the acquisition was totally against the provisions of Part VII of the Act and, therefore, the acquisition deserves to be quashed. Having broadly set out the contours of the factual aspects of the case and the legal challenges made by the petitioners to the action of the State, we now propose to go into the matter in detail and deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

(3.) The first and foremost submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the acquisition is for a company and not in pursuance to any public purpose, hence the present acquisition is one which has been made under the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and not under the provisions of Part II and since the acquisition is under Part VII, the procedure as envisaged therein ought to have been followed and any violation of the provisions contained in Part VII would result in the entire acquisition proceedings being vitiated. Building up his case on this premise he went on to say that the impugned notification is vague, inasmuch as it does not define the purpose of acquisition clearly and therefore, this has prejudiced the rights of the petitioners. Further, the provisions of Sections 38 to 44 have to be read in conjunction with each other and violation of any part of these provisions would render the entire acquisition void. Sections 38, 40, 41, 42 and 44-B are extracted herein as the entire submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners centre around these provisions :-