MOOL CHAND GUPTA Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD counsel. A complaint was presented against he petitioner hereinbefore Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal. Later on, by the bifurcation of the District, the matter was transferred to Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat took cognizance of the case on 15.2.1987. The complaint was regarding certain alleged offences arising under Sections 18(a), 18A, 27(b)(ii) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1940 and the rules of 1945. Section 36-A of the said Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure all offences under this Act, punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, other than an offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 33-I shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 of the said code shall apply to such trial.

(2.) IT is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for State that the punishment for violation of these offences mentioned in sections 18-A, 18-C read with section 27B(2) and section 28 is only three years in the maximum. Therefore, these cases are to be tried only in summary manner. The power to try such cases in a summary manner was conferred on the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat, only on 20.9.1991 and, therefore, on the day when the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat, took cognizance of these offences, he had no jurisdiction to try the case in a summary manner. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of this High Court in Shiv Lal Yadav v. The State of Haryana, (1994(1) C.L.R. 67) and contends that there being no notification empowering the Chief Judicial Magistrate, to try the case in a summary manner in terms of section 36-A of the Act when the case was taken cognizance by him the proceedings in question taken by the said court are void and without jurisdiction and, therefore, complaint and the consequent proceedings have to be quashed. Learned counsel appearing for the State is also unable to dispute those facts mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioner. So, the present case is squarely covered by the decision cited above. Hence the petition is allowed and the complaint and the consequent proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat, mentioned in the petition are quashed. Petition allowed.