DAYALBAGH SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS Vs. YASHPAL SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.8.1993 passed by the lower appellate Court reversing that of the trial Court whereby the suit of the plaintiff-respondent challenging the order of his dismissal from service has been decreed.

(2.) The facts giving rise to this appeal are as under. Yash Pal Sharma, the plaintiff-respondent was employed as a Dispenser in the year 1979 with M/s Dayalbagh Spinning and Weaving Mills, Amritsar - a unit of the National Textile Corporation of India, the appellant herein. He was placed under suspension on 16.7.1987 and a regular departmental inquiry was held after serving on him a memorandum of charges on 5.8.1987. It was alleged that on 12.6.1987 the Senior Administrative Manager of Mills was criminally assaulted at his residence situated in the factory compound by some outsiders and that the plaintiff was involved in that conspiracy. The Inquiry Officer found the plaintiff guilty of the charges levelled against him and accordingly submitted his report to the General Manager who by an order, dated 26.3.1988 dismissed the plaintiff from service. The General Manager also directed that the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any salary for the period during which he remained under suspension except the subsistence allowance which already stood paid to him. The order of dismissal was challenged by the plaintiff by filing a suit for declaration to the effect that the said order was illegal, null and void and against the principles of natural justice. The suit was contested by the defendant-appellant and it was pleaded that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the dispute sought to be raised by the plaintiff was squarely covered by the definition of an 'industrial dispute' as given in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . On merits, the order was sought to be justified on the ground that a regular departmental inquiry was held against the plaintiff in which he was afforded full opportunity to lead his evidence in defence and that he cross-examined the witnesses produced by the management. It was further pleaded that in view of the serious charge which stood proved against the plaintiff, the order of dismissal from service was legal and justified.

(3.) A preliminary issue was framed as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter. That issue was decided against the plaintiff and consequently the suit was dismissed. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter and remanded the case back to the trial Court for framing issues on merits and for deciding the same in accordance with law. After recording evidence of the parties and hearing their counsel, the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the order of dismissal was legal and valid and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the declaration sought for. The plaintiff then filed an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar and raised two contentions. Firstly, it was contended that the impugned order of dismissal was illegal because the General Manager while denying to the plaintiff his salary during the suspension period, did not issue any show cause notice to that effect and since that part of the order adversely affected the emoluments drawn by the plaintiff, the order could not be sustained. Secondly, it was argued before the lower appellate Court that the General Manager, before passing impugned order, did not supply a copy of the inquiry report to the plaintiff so as to enable him to file his objections thereto and thus the principles of natural justice stood contravened. Both the contentions were accepted by the learned Additional District Judge who in support of his decision on the second contention relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991 AIR(SC) 471Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the declaration prayed for was granted and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent decreed. Hence the second appeal by the defendant-appellant.