MANJIT SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal has come up for hearing after notice as per order dated 15.9.1995. I have heard the counsel for the parties at length. At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellant has conceded that the appellant assails the appeal on merits and is restricting his submission to the question of grant of probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation Offenders Act, 1958 instead of probation under Section 4(3) of the said Act.

(2.) IT is not necessary to reproduce the facts in detail. On 26.6.1990 at about 6.58 P.M., Amar Nath Sethi, Chief Editor, Weekly Samrala Times, Samrala parked his moped near the shop of Inder Nath near Dabi Bazar, Samrala. After locking the moped, he went to the corner for some business. After some time he returned and found his moped missing alongwith the bag containing driving licence, seven LPG cooking gas cards and one Cheque. On 9.9.1990 S.I. Gurnam Singh SHO Police Station, Samrala alongwith Kuldip Singh ASI conducted a nakabandi on Samrala-Chawa road. At about 9.10 p.m. a moped came from the side of Chawa road which was being driven by Manjit Singh and Garib Dass. S.I. Gurnam Singh intercepted them and on an enquiry, the moped was found stolen. On interrogation, papers like driving licence etc. were found in the possession of Jagpal Singh accused. It is in these circumstances that these three accused were challaned and charged under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code vide order dated 7.1.1991. The statement of the prosecution witness was concluded by examining 5 witnesses. In their statements under Sections 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the accused took up the stand that they were falsely implicated. The learned Magistrate vide his judgment dated 15.5.1992 acquitted Jagpal Singh and Garib Dass while he convicted the present appellant namely Manjit Singh. The appellant was convicted to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 9 months and Rs. 500/- as fine and in default thereof to further undergo R.I. for three months.

(3.) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the scheme of the Probation of Offenders Act, is primarily to improve himself and not to unnecessarily interfere with his liberty. The scheme of the Act shows that the Court can grant benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 4(1) of the Act and can also grant benefit to the accused without putting any restriction. If the accused is to be granted benefit under Section 4(3) of the Act, it primarily introduces the element of specific reasoning on the part of the Court. The Court must satisfy itself, and express its opinion that it is in the interest of the offender and as well as of the public and is expedient to do so that the accused is released on probation under the supervision of the Probation Officer. The learned counsel for the appellant has rightly argued that the order of the learned Sessions Judge does not specify and such reasons. The order really appears to be an order passed under Section 4(1) of the Act. Unless specific reasons are given and the Court concerned records its findings that the ingredients under Section 4(1) of the Act are satisfied, it will be unreasonable to treat it as an order under this section.