SUKHDEV RAJ Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties at some length. This case was directed to be listed for re-hearing in view of the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.K. Bali on 16.2.1995. From further argument it is clear that the factum of previous conviction of the petitioner was not obviously brought to the notice of the Additional Sessions Judge, Designated Court, Amritsar on 7.1.1991 and consequently the Court could not have considered the question of previous sentence awarded to the accused-petitioner to run concurrently or otherwise.

(2.) AT this stage, it would be relevant to make reference to the provisions of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In sub-section 1 of Section 427 of the Code, the sentence awarded to an accused in two cases to run one after the other unless the Court directs the subsequent sentence awarded to the accused to run concurrently, while the provisions of Sub-Section 2 of the Section 427 of the Code relate to life convict and punishment awarded to an accused/convict subsequently which shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. The provisions of sub section 2 of the Section 427 of the Code, therefore, cover different class of cases which are not inter-changeable. Reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory Chandigarh and another, AIR 1991 SC 2296, is of no avail to the State inasmuch as the said judgment deals with the question arising under Section 427(2) of the Code. The cited case related to an accused who was awarded life imprisonment twice in different cases and they were directed not to run concurrently and one was to commence after the first imprisonment was satisfied if the sentence of the accused is computed. There is no doubt that the accused in the present case had not brought to the notice of the Trial Court which convicted him on 7.1.1991, his previous conviction. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner it was for the State to bring it to the notice of the Court because the accused was jail. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State submits that it was for the mala fide intention that the accused did not bring this fact to the notice of the Trial Court because it might have affected the quantum of sentence which might have been awarded to him by the Court concerned.

(3.) AS I have already discussed that the judgment of the Supreme Court does not prohibit the granting of such relief and in fact, said judgment has no application of the facts of the present case. I maintain the order dated 20.9.1995 as it was pronounced. This order shall form part of my order dated 20.9.1995.