LAWS(P&H)-1995-1-95

DEVINDER KUMAR Vs. VINOD

Decided On January 06, 1995
DEVINDER KUMAR Appellant
V/S
VINOD Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been filed by Devinder Kumar through Shri Khub Chand against the award of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bhiwani, dated 16.7.1992, dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the claim petition,

(2.) The appellant - claimant filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, claiming compensation of Rupees five lacs on account of alleged injuries sustained by him in vehicular accident on 26.1.1991 and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(3.) The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bhiwani, dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by holding that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the claim petitioner under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Aggrieved against the same, the claimant had filed the present appeal. After having heard the counsel for both the sides, I am of the considered view that the appellant had given sufficient reasons in the application under Section 5 of the limitation Act for condonation of delay. The grounds taken in the application are that the appellant was admitted to Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi for plastic surgery and skin grafting on 22.3.1991 and remained admitted there upto 15.4.1991. The appellant on discharge from the said hospital was called for review many times. The appellant had to go from Charkhi Dadri to Delhi and he must have been in pain due to injuries which resulted in loss of skin. The appellant was readmitted for second operation on 13.7.1991 and remained admitted upto 29,7,1991, The appellant was again admitted on 6.9.1991 and operation was again performed, On discharge the appellant was also advised physiotherapy at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi. The claim was filed by the appellant through his father natural guardian on 17.1.1992. I am of the view that there was no negligence on the part of appellant's father which could be attributed to him. The first priority of the father must have been to provide treatment to his injured child and filing of claim application could be postponed being of secondary importance.