YAGIA DATT Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER worked as a chowkidar with the Market Committee, Amritsar (hereinafter called the committee) w.e.f. 1,10.1976 to 26.6.1977 with some breaks. His employment came to an end when the last period of his appointment expired on 26.6.1977. He then filed a departmental appeal against the termination of his employment and while the same was pending he was re - employed on 2.11.1977 as an Auction Recorder for 89 days by the committee, He joined his new employment without prejudice to his rights to challenge his termination on 26.6.1977, This employment also came to an end by efflux of time on 29.1.1978. A demand notice dated 21.8.1979 was served by the workman -petitioner on the committee challenging his termination on 26,6.1977. The dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Amritsar, After recording evidence of the parties and hearing their representatives, the Labour Court found that the services of the petitioner were terminated by efflux of time and, therefrom there was no 'retrenchment' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was further held that since the workman was given fresh employment as an Motion Recorder on 2.11.1977, he could not challenge the earlier termination on 26.6,1977. Consequently, the reference was decided against the workman and in favour of the management and the former was held not entitled to any relief. It is this award of the Labour Court that is now under challenge in the present petition filed by the workman under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) THE argument of Mr. J.C. Verma, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner -workman is that even though the services of the petitioner came to an end by efflux of time, such termination amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act and since section 25 -F of the Act had not been complied with the termination could not be held to be relied. He contented that merely because the workman had joined his fresh employment for 89 days he was not estopped from challenging his previous termination on 26.6.1977 which was in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act. I find merit in both the contentions. It is by now well settled that the termination of services of a workman for any reason whatsoever is retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act unless it falls in any of the exceptions mentioned therein. Termination of services by efflux of time has not been exception and it, therefore, amounts to retrenchment. This being so, it was necessary for the committee to have complied with the provisions of Section 25 -F of the Act. Not having done so, the termination of services of the workman cannot be held to be legal. Again, it is not under standable as to how the workman was debarred from challenging the termination of his services on 26.6.1977 merely because during the pendency of his departmental appeal he was given a fresh employment for 89 days which he joined on 2.11.1977. The view taken by the Labour Court in this regard is also erroneous and cannot, therefore, be accepted.