HIRA LAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DURING the arguments in this appeal on 25th July, 1995, it was asserted by his counsel that the appellant Hira Lal was a juvenile on 2nd April, 1986 when he was alleged to have committed the offence. On this assertion, we sought a report from a Medical Board to be set up by the Principal Medical College, Amritsar and the report has been received which is to the effect that on 14.8.1995 when the Board had examined the appellant, he appeared to be between 22 to 25 years of age. It is, therefore, apparent to us that even taking the outside limit against the appellant on 2nd April, 1986, he was in fact less than 16 years of age.

(2.) MR . Merchea had initially argued that as the appellant was a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 on the date when he had committed the offence, the proceedings leading to his trial and the trial itself were without jurisdiction and needed to be quashed.

(3.) MR . Gill, teamed DAG, However, pointed out in the course of the arguments that the Juvenile Justice Act had come into force in the year 1986 that is long after the offence had been committed and as such the present matter was not covered thereunder. Mr. Merchea then placed reliance on the provisions of the East Punjab Children Act, 1949 and contended that the provisions with regard to the trial of a child who was defined as a person being less than 16 years of age were pari materia with the Juvenile Justice Act and the trial under that Act too stood vitiated and the appellant was entitled to release. In support of this plea he has placed reliance on Jayendra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1982SC 685 which was a judgment under the U.P. Children Act the provisions of which are pari materia with the East Punjab Children Act, 1949, Mr. Gill has however relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court reported as Krishna Bhagwan v. State of Bihar 1991(2) R.C.R. 450 : [1990(1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 22 (Patna)] in which it has been held that where a child had been tried under the ordinary taw before the Juvenile Justice Act had come into force but that child had been convicted thereafter, the proceedings of Juvenile the Justice Act would not effect the conviction of such an accused if otherwise it was found on merits that his conviction was in order but the sentence was liable to be set aside and the matter remitted to the Juvenile Court for redecision.