SHANTI SARUP Vs. BALDEVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Suraj Parkash, respondent No. 2, sold land measuring 127 Kanals 2 Marlas situated in Sadhaura to Shanti Sarup, appellant, through a registered sale-deed dated 29.6.1966 for consideration of Rs. 23825/-. Baldeva, respondent No. 1, filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of land measuring 82 Kanals 13 Marlas, as described in the plaint, out of the land purchased by the appellant, claiming that he had a superior right to pre-empt this land as he was a tenant on the said land. Shanti Sarup appellant contested the suit. He denied the claim of respondent No. 1 and pleaded that he took actual possession of the land after its sale in his favour and that Baldeva was never its tenant. In the alternative, he pleaded that it was the appellant who had inducted respondent No. 1 as his tenant in Khasra Nos. 50/12/3, 50/19, 22 and 54/2,3 after purchase of the land by him. He took another alternative plea to the effect that the suit was bad for partial pre- emption. The learned Sub Judge 2nd Class, Ambala City, dismissed the suit of respondent No. 1, vide judgment and decree dated 9.1.1975. On an appeal filed by respondent No. 1, the learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, vide orders dated 24.1.1977, and held that respondent No. 1 had the right to pre-empt land measuring 42 Kanals 6 Marlas comprising in field Nos. 50/9, 50/12/3, 50/19, 50/23, 50/24, 54/2 and 54/3 and granted a decree of pre-emption in his favour on payment of proportionate price of the land and proportionate sale expenses, i.e., Rs. 8098/- and Rs. 546/- respectively. The present appeal is by the vendee- appellant against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 24.1.1977.

(2.) The learned Sub-Judge 2nd Class, Ambala City, had dismissed the suit of respondent No. 1 on the ground that it was for partial pre-emption by returning a finding in the affirmative on issue No. 5 which was to the effect :-

(3.) I disagree with the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge. The pleadings contained in paragraph 3 (a) of the written statement are to be read as a whole. As against the pleadings of the appellant that respondent No. 1 was not at all a tenant on the land which is the subject- matter of the suit, it has been found as a fact by both the Courts below that respondent No. 1 was a tenant. This discarded not only the first plea of the appellant as contained in paragraph 3 (a) of the written statement to the effect that respondent No. 1 was not a tenant at the time of sale but also did away with his alternative plea that respondent No. 1 was, in fact, inducted as a tenant on a part of the land by the appellant himself after he purchased the land. It is not possible to segregate a part of the plea of the appellant pertaining to land bearing Khasra No. 50/22 alone and hold that, since it was the appellant's assertion that on the land bearing Khasra No. 50/22 it was the appellant himself who inducted respondent No. 1 as a tenant after the land was sold to him, he could not prove from the record during the course of trial that respondent No. 1 was a sitting tenant in respect of Khasra No. 50/22 at the time of sale. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1, no doubt, with a lot of vehemence, tried to support the above approach of the learned Additional District Judge but I do not think that this approach is sound in law. Pleadings have to be read as a whole and, when alternative pleas are taken, one of them cannot, by itself, be treated as an admission on the part of the party. When one of the alternative pleas taken by a party is found to have not been proved, he can fall back upon the other alternative pleas. This position of law is well recognized. Khasra Girdawaris, Exhibits C-6 and D-2, prove that in Kharif 1966, respondent No. 1 was in possession of the land bearing Khasra No. 50/22. Kharif season starts from May and ends with October of a particular year. The present sale admittedly took place on 29.6.1966. It is thus clear that respondent No. 1 was in possession as a tenant of this particular piece of land, in respect of the sale of which he did not seek a decree for pre-emption. The observation of the learned Additional District Judge that no presumption of truth can be attached to the Khasra Girdawaris, in my opinion, is also not correct, particularly when there is no other cogent evidence on the record, much less any documentary evidence, which might detract from the correctness of the Khasra Girdawaris mentioned above. The imperative conclusion, therefore, is that the suit of respondent No. 1 was bad for partial pre-emption.