LEELA DEVI Vs. POORAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two petitions, Cr. Misc. Application Nos. 2023-M and 2024-M of 1984 can conveniently be disposed of by a common order. These arise invoking inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

(2.) THE petitioner in each case is related to each other as sister. Similarly, the husband in each case is related to each other as brother. They individually preferred claims against their respective husband-respondents for maintenance under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code. The same criminal court decided those petitions holding that the claim of maintenance was not maintainable in view of the judgment inter-parts by the Matrimonial Court Ex. R.1. The court of Session affirmed that view and that is how these petitions have been filed.

(3.) THE view taken by the Courts below is that since the same allegations have been made by the petitioners in their respective petitions, as were those made in the respective petitions for divorce, the findings recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala, on those facts were relevant and were of binding character on the criminal court while determining whether there was any sufficient cause for the wives to live away from their respective husbands. That was in keeping with the mandate of sub-section (4) of section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, which debars a wife to claim maintenance from her husband under that section if she was living in adultery or if without any sufficient reasons she refused to live with her husband, or if they were liring separately with mutual consent. But here the learned counsel for the petitioners are at pains to contend that the courts below should have independently come to the conclusion, keeping apart the judgments of the Matrimonial Court as to whether there was sufficient reason for each petitioner to live away from their respective husbands and not just to assume that conduct on the existence of the judgments of the Matrimonial Courts. I am unimpressed by the logic behind this argument. The finding of the Matrimonial Court was even affirmed by this court when it dismissed the first appeals against order on 20.8.1982. This obviously meant that the claims respectively made that each petitioner had been subjected to cruelty and had been turned out of the house 15 days after the marriage stood not proved. The same cruelty, the same beating and the same turning out could not be readjudicated upon in the Criminal Court in the presence of the plea having been rejected by the Matrimonial Court. If not for anything else, at least constructively as an estoppel. I am thus of the considered view that the reason pleaded by each petitioner for refusal to live with her respective husband was not sufficient in view of such a stance having already been rejected by the Matrimonial Court.