HARI MITTAL Vs. B M SIKKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DOUBT as to the correctness of law laid down by the Division Bench in M. P. Bansal v. District Employment Officer (Civil Revision No. 2262 of 1981) decided on Mar. 16. 1985, reported in AIR 1985 Punj and Har 251, entertained by a Division Bench, led to the reference to Full Bench of three Civil Revision Petitioners, namely, No. 1108 of 1983 at the instance of the Division Bench itself and Nos. 2202 of 1982 and 3063 of 1984 by J. V. Gupta, J. in the wake of the said earlier reference order by the Division Bench.

(2.) BEFORE the examination of the relevant legal queries that arise in regard to the law laid down in Bansal's case (AIR 1985 Punj and Har 251) a brief resume of the facts of the three revision petitioners would help in viewing the said legal queries in proper perspective.

(3.) IN Civil Revision No. 1108 of 1983, Shri Hari Mittal, Advocate, tenant-pet, had taken on rent House NO. 1278, sector 18-C, Chandigarh, on 21-11-1969, at a time when he was employed as a District Attorney on deputation with the Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration, from his landlord Shri B. M. Sikka, who too at that time was a Government employee. Shri Sikka was to retire from service on 31-43-1980. He sought eviction of the said tenant, inter alia, on the ground that the house was given for residence and the tenant has changed the user thereof by using it partly for his business as an advocate and that the landlord was retiring from service and wanted to settle down in Chandigarh and needed the house for his own bona fide use and occupation. The tenant, inter alia, took up the stand that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, was made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from 4-11-1972 and since the tenanted premises had been used partly for the professional business of the advocate and residence before that date, therefore the ground of change of user for the purpose of eviction was not available to the landlord and further the tenanted premises being used partly for residence and partly for the business of the tenant-advocate, the building had acquired the character of a scheduled building and, therefore, the tenant could not be ejected on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord as well.