MOHINDER KAUR Vs. RANA JOGINDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In a suit for pre-emption, the plaintiffs asserted a superior right of pre-emption on the ground that they were the sons of the vendor-Smt. Satya Vati and the brothers of the other vendor-Vinod Kumar and further that they were the co-sherers in the land too. When all the evidence had been led and the case was at the stage of arguments, with limitation for the filing of a fresh suit long having expired since then, an amendment of the plaint was sought to take up the plea "that, Smt. Satya Vati, vendor, defendant No. 2 who is the step-mother of the plaintiffs, succeeded to her share in the suit land through her husband, that is, inherited the same from her husband-Sh. Gobinder Singh". In other words, the claim for pre-emption was sought to be put forth under Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emtpion Act, 1913 (hereinafter called 'the Act"). The trial Court clearly fell in error in allowing this amendment.

(2.) It is now well settled that in a suit for pre-emption where the superior right of pre-emption is founded upon Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, all the necessary facts, as would bring the case under that provision of law, must be specifically pleaded and that too within the period of limitation for the filing of the suit. In this behalf two judgments of this Court deserve mention. The first being Dalip Singh v. Uttam Singh, 1970 PunLJ 776, where it was held that the plaintiff, in a pre-emption suit, who relies on Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, must plead the necessary facts as contemplated therein; merely pleading that the plaintiff had a right of pre-emption under Section 15 of the Act, was not enough. In the other case, Shanker Singh v. Chanan Singh, 1968 CurLJ 363, it was held that the specific ground on which the preferential right of pre-emption is claimed, must be specifically pleaded in the suit and that too within the period of limitation. The right which accrues to the vendee to defeat the plaintiff's claim, as not coming within the statutory provision upon which reliance is placed, cannot be allowed to be defeated by amendment of the plaint after the period of limitation for the filing of the suit has expired.

(3.) Considered in this light, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the trial Court erred in allowing the amendment whereby it permitted the plaintiff to put-forth the necessary pleas to bring the case under Section 15(2)(b) of the Act and that too after the period of limitation had expired. The impugned order of the trial Court is accordingly set aside. The defendant-vendee shall be entitled to her costs in this petition. Counsel fee Rs. 300/-.