(1.) THIS is landlady's petition whose ejectment application has been dismissed by both the authorities below.
(2.) SMT . Krishan Sachdeva, the landlady, sought the ejectment of the tenant Hans Raj from the premises in dispute which consists of one room inter alia on the ground that she bonafide required the same for her own use and occupation. It was pleaded that at present she was residing in the rented premises consisting of one small room, verandah and small kitchen and that she is not in exclusive possession of the kitchen and that the rented premises were insufficient for a large family of seven members consisting of herself, her husband and five children. It was further pleaded that all her five children are school going and her husband has left his services at Saharanpur and lived with her for the last 1-1/2 years. The ejectment application was filed on 22nd February, 1980. It was also pleaded that she has no other premises to live in except the demised premises nor she had vacated any such premises within the municipal limits of Yamuna Nagar after the commencement of the Act. In the written statement filed on behalf of the tenant, these pleas were controverted. It was pleaded that the landlady owned and possessed a house at Yamuna Nagar which she sold recently and transferred the possession of the house to the vendee. It was also pleaded that an ejectment application filed earlier has already been dismissed and, therefore, the present application was barred under the principle of res judicata. The learned Rent Controller found that the landlady does not require the premises in dispute for the use and occupation and as a result of that conclusion the eviction application was dismissed. In appeal, the learned Appellate Authority affirmed the said finding of the Rent Controller. Dissatisfied with the same, the landlady has filed this petition in this Court.
(3.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The authorities below have mainly relied upon the fact that the house which was sold by the landlady on April 11, 1978 was occupied by her and, therefore, it could not be said that she did not vacate the premises after the commencement of the Act. Reliance has been placed in this behalf on Exhibit R-1 dated 30th July, 1980, judgment of the Rent Controller in an earlier ejectment application filed on behalf of the landlady. From the evidence on the record, I am of the view that the whole approach is wrong and misconceived. Kimti Lal to whom the said house was sold was occupying the same as tenant. She produced him as A.W.5. He stated that he was occupying the house as tenant and since he refused to vacate the same, the same was sold to him by the landlady. The landlady herself appeared in the witness box as A.W.1. She also stated that the house was occupied by her tenant Kimti Lal which was sold to him because she was unable to get it vacated. No question was put to her in her cross-examination that she was in occupation of the said house. Thus, from the evidence on the record it could not be held that the house which was sold by the landlady in the year 1978 was occupied by her. In the circumstances, the question that she has vacated the premises after the commencement of the Act did not arise. Apart from that, even if we assume that she was in occupation of the said house, the said house was sold as it was away from the house where the landlady was residing with her mother. It was necessary because her children were being looked after by her mother. She purchased the house in dispute because it is adjacent to that house and the wall of both the houses is common. In these circumstances, she will be deemed to have vacated the house for a sufficient cause. Once it is so held, then it is in evidence and has not been denied that she is in occupation of one room and kitchen with her mother. That house with her mother consists of three rooms, two rooms are with her mother whereas one room has been rented out to the landlady. The family consists of five children and her husband. For family of seven members, one room was hardly sufficient. She purchased the house in dispute in order to live comfortably and, therefore, in these circumstances, the requirement of the landlady is most bonafide to occupy the demised premises. Nothing has been brought on the record to suggest that her intention was bonafide in any manner. As observed earlier, the only contention raised was that since she sold the house which was in her occupation, she could not be allowed to eject the tenant from the demised premises.