MARKET COMMITTEE, SAFIDON Vs. SHEETAL PARKASH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Market Committee, Safidon, through its Secretary has filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying therein that the judgment of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Safidon, dated 15th September, 1983, and that of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, dated 13th July, 1984 be quashed.

(2.) THE facts which gave rise to this petition are as under. The respondent firm deals in sale, purchase, storage and processing of agricultural produce as kacha arrhtia in the notified area of Safidon. The firm is a licensee under Section 10 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. The Market Committee Safidon, through its Secretary filed a criminal complaint against the respondents for the violation of sub -rule (11) of rule 24 punishable under rule 39 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (General) Rules, 1962, and also for the violation of the condition of the licence granted to the firm under the Act. On a notice issued by the learned trial Magistrate, the respondents put in their appearance in the Court. The learned Magistrate recorded some evidence of the complainant and dismissed the complaint on the short ground that the Secretary of the market Committee, Safidon, was not competent to file the complaint unless he was formally authorised by the Committee. Aggrieved by the order of the learned trial Magistrate, the Committee through its Secretary filed a revision in the Court of Session. The same came up for final hearing before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jind. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, relying upon a Single Bench authority of this Court reported as Raja Ram Trehan v. Principle, Sunarshan Singh, Malva khalsa Higher Secondary School, Ferozepur City, 1981 Cr. LJ 1469, dismissed the revision of the Committee on the short ground that since the order of the trial Magistrate amounted to an acquittal of the respondents, so no revision was competent. Hence, this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(3.) APPARENTLY , this complaint was to be tried as a summons case. In a summons case, the trial Magistrate was neither to charge the respondents nor to discharge them. He dismissed the complaint on the short ground that cognizance could not be taken because the complaint was not filed by a person who was duly authorised. So, at best the trial Magistrate could dismiss the complaint and discharge the bail bonds of the respondents. The order of the learned trial Magistrate certainly does not amount to an acquittal. A bare reading of section 39(2) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, shows that the Secretary of the Market Committee is competent to file a complaint without any authorisation. Section 39(2) of the Act reads as under : - "39(2) Prosecution under this Act may be instituted by the Chairman or the Secretary of the Board or the Chairman or Secretary of a Committee or by any other person authorised by the Board or a Committee." The interpretation put forth by the learned trial Magistrate is on the face of it wrong. In view of Section 39(2), the Secretary or the Chairman of a Committee does not need any authorisation to file complaint. An authorisation is needed only by a person other than the Chairman or Secretary of a Committee. So, I am of the view that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, was certainly competent to hear the revision on merits because the ratio of Raja Ram Trehan's case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case, as in that case the trial Magistrate discharged the accused under section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provision deals with the procedure in warrant cases. The learned trial Magistrate had considered the whole evidence for the prosecution and discharge the accused on merits. The learned Singh Judge came to a finding that since the prosecution failed to prove the accusation against the accused which, if unrebutted by him would stand substantiated beyond all reasonable doubt, so the discharge should amount to an acquittal.