LAWS(P&H)-1985-1-133

HARCHAND Vs. MURTI DADU DIAL AND OTHERS

Decided On January 21, 1985
HARCHAND Appellant
V/S
MURTI DADU DIAL AND OTHERS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Harchand petitioner filed a suit, giving rise to this petition, for declaration and also for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing him from the land in dispute. Along with this suit he filed an application for ad-interim injunction to the same effect.

(2.) The material averments leading to the suit were that an application for ejectment of the petitioner from the land in dispute was filed by Murti Dadu Dayal through its trustees before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and the same was allowed. That order of the Assistant Collector was confirmed upto the Financial Commissioner. It was alleged in the plaint that the land in dispute was owned by Dadu Dayal Trust, and, as such, Murti Dadu Dayal had no right to start ejectment proceeding against the petitioner and, therefore, the ejectment orders passed against him were null and void. The trial Court declined the application for ad- interim injunction on the ground that when a person pursues his legal remedy in a Court of law, may be to eject the plaintiff, he cannot by any stretch of reasoning to be said to threaten to dispossess or cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to the suit property. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed by the Courts below on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Madan Lal & Ors. v. Dil Singh,1982 PunLR 63, wherein it was observed as under :-

(3.) The impugned order has been assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the same ground on which the Courts below had declined the prayer for ad-interim injunction. I am unable to find any substance in the argument that the Courts below had acted illegally by not granting ad- interim injunction to the petitioner during the pendency of the suit when the suit was for declaration and injunction pending trial. The learned counsel for the petitioner also cited Harbans Singh v. Nahar Singh, 1978 PunLJ 137. On perusal, I find that the facts in that case are quite distinguishable and the ratio thereof is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.