LAWS(P&H)-1985-7-8

ROMESH KUMAR Vs. ATMA DEVI

Decided On July 12, 1985
ROMESH KUMAR Appellant
V/S
ATMA DEVI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two revisions (C.R. No. 412 of 1980 and C.R. No.644 of 1981) have been put up before us on a reference by M.M. Punchhi, J. with whom my learned brother Tewatia, J. concurred as the correctness of the decision in Karnail Singh v. Vidya Devi alias Bedo, (1980) 2 Rent CJ 188 (Punj and Har) was doubted. For the purpose of this judgment, the facts of C.R. No.412 of 1980 have been noticed.

(2.) The petitioner was ordered to be ejected from the demised premises on the ground that Smt. Atma Devi, the owner, required it for her personal occupation. The correctness of this order was assailed on the ground that Smt. Atma Devi was living in a rented house and unless it is established that she has a reasonable cause to vacate that house, she cannot claim her own house on the ground of personal necessity. Reliance for this contention was placed on the following passage in Karnail Singh's case (Supra) : "Coming back to the interpretation of sub-clause (b) reproduced above, if the Legislature wanted that the occupation of another residential premises in the urban area concerned should be as owner or as 'landlord' (the definition of 'landlord' shows that a person other than that of owner can also be a landlord) then it would have been provided in sub-clause (b) but by not adding these words the intention of the legislature is clear that only possession as of right whether as owner, landlord, tenant, mortgagee with possession or in any other form, recognised by law, was to be taken into consideration for seeing the occupation of the landlord for purposes of sub-clause (b). In nutshell, the sole basis of enacting sub-clause (b) was that if the landlord is occupying any other residential building in his own right, that is possession recognised by law, then he could not claim eviction from another residential building in the same urban area. Unless we read sub-clause (b) as follows, no other conclusion is possible :- "He is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned as an owner." Therefore, on a reading of sub-clause (b) as it stands in the statute book, we hold that if the landlord is in possession of another residential building in the same urban area, whether as owner, landlord tenant, mortgagee with possession or in any other recognised mode, having right in property, he would not be able to claim eviction of his tenant from other premises in the same urban area without alleging and proving anything more." The words, 'another residential building' in sub-clause (b) of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, according to Punchhi, J. means, "that the landlord is not occupying another residential building co-related to him in the manner of the residential building whose occupation he seeks from the tenant. In other words, the language employed by the statute is easily discernible that the landlord's occupation of another building in the urban area concerned means of such residential building as to which he should be related to also as a landlord." Support for this view was "sought from the following observations of Mehar Singh, J. as he then was, in Sant Ram Des Raj Kalka v. Karam Chand Mangal Ram, AIR 1963 Punj 1 (FB) :-

(3.) The question before the Full Bench in Sant Ram Des Raj's case (AIR 1963 Punj 1) (supra) was as to whether the landlord was entitled to get the house vacated for his personal use if the house in his possession was insufficient for his needs. It was in this context that the said observations were made and the words, 'another residential building' were interpreted to mean a building which meets the requirements and needs of the landlord and not any residential building. In our view, by no stretch of reasoning the said observations can be interpreted to mean that the building in occupation of the landlord must be his own or that he must hold that building in the same character which he claims qua the building from which the ejectment of the tenant is sought. In fact, argument was also raised before the Full Bench that the landlord who is in occupation of residential building in the urban area concerned as tenant would be entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant from his own building for his personal use as his occupation of the building as tenant was not in his own right, but the same was repelled as would be evident from the following passages :