KRISHNA FOUNDRY WORKS Vs. ADMINISTRATOR, MUNICIPALITY AMBALA CITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This judgment will dispose of Regular Second Appeal Nos. 2041 and 2085 of 1976, as the question involved is common in both the cases. The facts giving rise to Regular Second Appeal No. 2041 of 1976, are as follows.

(2.) The plaintiffs filed the suits for the grant of the permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from assessing, imposing or realising any octroi or any other amount in lieu of octroi from them in respect of the goods imported by them in their premises. According to them, their premises are situated in the area which was previously outside the municipal limits of Ambala City. By means of the notification dated February 21, 1974, the said area was included within the municipal limits of Ambala City. Consequently, the Municipality started assessing, imposing and realising octroi from them which according to them, was illegal. Since no octroi limits had been fixed under section 200(g) of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act), and no bye-law in respect of the collection of octroi had been framed, the extension of the municipal limits did not suo motu result in extension of octroi limits and consequently, the octroi limits thereof will remain the same as were demarcated by the State Government in the year 1967. According to the averments made in the plaint, the procedure prescribed under sections 72 and 69 of the Act for the imposition of the octroi in the area added to the municipal limits by means of the notification dated February 21, 1974, had also not been followed. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondent, it was pleaded that the business premises of the plaintiffs had been included in the municipal limits of the Ambala City by means of the notification dated February 21, 1974 and, therefore, the defendant was entitled to assess and impose octroi in respect of the goods brought in the said premises by the plaintiffs. It was also asserted that the octroi limits in the present cases were co-terminus with the municipal limits of the Municipality in view of the notification dated November 24, 1967, issued by the State of Haryana, for the levy of tax on the entry of goods into the municipal limits aforesaid, as noticed from time to time in the Government Gazette. The trial Court found that the realization of octroi from the plaintiff within the area included in the municipal limits vide notification dated February 21, 1974, Exhibit D.1, was illegal. The other pleas raised on behalf of the defendants were also negatived. In view of this finding, the plaintiff's suits were decreed. In appeal, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge with enhanced appellate powers, reversed the said finding of the trial Court and came to the conclusion that since the octroi was levied under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 , the relevant provisions of which were saved by the Act, there was no need of fixing any fresh municipal limits other than those mentioned in the notification dated November 24, 1967 and that the octroi automatically applied to the area included in the municipal limits by virtue of a valid notification. In view of this finding, the plaintiffs' suits were dismissed. Dissatisfied with the same, the plaintiffs have filed these two appeals in this Court.

(3.) The learned counsel for the appellants contended that section 200 of the Act provides for making the bye-laws for the purposes enumerated therein applicable to all or any of the municipalities, by notification, by the State Government. Clause (g) thereof provides that where the collection of an octroi has been sanctioned, the committees shall fix limits for the purpose of collecting the same and may prescribe routes by which animals or articles or both which are subject to octroi may be imported into the municipality. According to the learned counsel, since no bye-laws were framed by the State Government prior to March 19, 1976, the imposition of any octroi, by extending the municipal limits, was illegal. In support of the contention, the learned counsel relied upon Bagalkot City Municipality v. Bagalkot Cement Co., 1963 AIR(SC) 771and Gourishankar v. Marshinghpur Municipality, 1968 AIR(MP) 39.