(1.) An earlier similar application for additional evidence having been declined, no exception can be taken to the impugned order of the trial court disallowing such a prayer again.
(2.) The facts relevant to this matter are that when the trial stood at the stage of the evidence of the plaintiff in rebuttal and arguments, an application for additional evidence was filed on August 31, 1982, praying therein that the thumb impressions of Smt. Chawli appearing on her will dated April 18, 1978, as also on the power of attorney and written statement in the suit, which was decreed against her on March 8, 1976, may be compared with her "standard" thumb impressions and a Finger Print Expert may be allowed to be examined in this behalf. This application was dismissed by the trial court on December 8, 1982. This order was later challenged in revision in this court in Civil Revision 332 of 1983 (Mangat Ram V. Ram Piari) which was eventually dismissed as withdrawn on April 18, 1983. About ten months thereafter, that is, on February 21, 1984, another application for additional evidence to the same effect was filed, which was dismissed by the impugned order of the trial court of January 21, 1985. A reading of the prayer clause in the two applications for additional evidence, namely, that of August 31, 1982 and the later one of February 21, 1984, would show that the only difference was that whereas in the former, comparison of the thumb impressions on the power of attorney, written statement and will was sought with the "standard" thumb impressions of Smt. Chawli, in the latter, the prayer was for comparison with the thumb impression of Smt. Chawli appearing on the sale-deed of February 8, 1958. Before proceeding further, it may be mentioned here that this sale-deed is on record, but it has neither been proved nor exhibited.
(3.) On the face of it, the principles of res judicata clearly bar this second application for additional evidence filed on February 21, 1984. It would indeed have been an abuse of the process of court if the relief having once been denied were to be allowed by the trial court on a subsequent application made for the same purpose. This view is in keeping with the observations made by the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh V. Mohindra Kumar and others, 1964 AIR(SC) 993