RAJ KUMAR Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner's application filed under section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (for short, the Act) for ejectment of the respondent-tenant Hira Lal though was allowed by the subordinate officers upto the level of the Commissioner yet has been dismissed by the Financial Commissioner vide his order dated November 18, 1977 Annexure P.6. The ground pleaded for ejectment was that he was a small landowner [section 9(1)(i)] and the respondent-tenant was in possession of more than 5 standard acres of other land (section 9-A). The petitioner impugnes this order, i.e. Annexure P.6.

(2.) The reason for declining the prayer of the petitioner as recorded in this order is that Raj Kumar i.e. the petitioner "is only a limited mortgagee on the land in dispute and he appears to have been used by Har Gurdial Singh landowner as an instrument for ejecting Hira Lal-tenant. There is also nothing on the record to show that Hira Lal tenant was brought on the land by mortgagee Raj Kumar". As is well indicated by this order, Har Gurdial Singh was the original landowner and he mortgaged it in favour of one Savitri Devi on November 26, 1968. Later, on May 11, 1973, another usufructary mortgage was created in favour of the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 6,000/- out of which Rs. 4,000/- were left with the petitioner to redeem the earlier mortgage. Thus the settled or admitted facts are that the petitioner became the mortgagee of this land w.e.f. May 11, 1973 and Hira Lal respondent was a tenant on that land much earlier to that date.

(3.) The primary submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner now is that the above-noted conclusion of the Financial Commissioner that mortgage in question had been created only with a view to eject Hira Lal respondent is not based on any material on record and he was also under a wrong impression that in order to eject the respondent the petitioner was under an obligation to establish the status of Har Gurdial Singh as a small landowner. While I find merit in the first contention of the learned counsel I find none in the later one. Even the learned counsel for the respondent is not in a position to refer to any material circumstance on record to justify the conclusion of the Financial Commissioner that mortgage in question had been created only with a view to eject the respondent. Rather the earlier mortgage in favour of Savitri Devi completely negatives any such inference. In the light of this, the said conclusion of the financial Commissioner has obviously to be set aside and I order accordingly.