MUNI LAL MEHRA Vs. KARTAR KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition for revision of the order dated the 28th of August, 1975, of Shri T.S. Cheema, Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has arisen in the following circumstances. Kartar Kaur, the respondent before me, filed an application under section 13 of the Act against Muni Lal Mehra petitioner for the latter's eviction from a residential building situated within the urban area of Amritsar on the ground, amongst others, that she required the same for her own residence. Her application was dismissed by the learned Controller against whose judgment she filed an appeal during the pendency of which she made an application for amendment of her pleadings so as to incorporate therein allegations in conformity with the requirements of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 13 (3) (i) of the Act. By the impugned order, the learned Appellate Authority allowed the prayer and simultaneously set aside the judgment of the Controller to whom the case was remanded with a direction that it be re-heard and decided afresh after allowing Kartar Kaur an opportunity to amend her pleadings. That is how the appeal was disposed of.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that permission should not have been granted to the respondent to amend her pleadings but no ground has been put forward in support of the contention which I find to be without substance. It is admitted on all hands that Kartar Kaur had specified in her application under section 13 of the Act that she required the building in dispute for her own residence but had failed to make mention of the other requirements of the statute, namely, that she was not occupying any other residential building within the urban area of Amritsar and that she had not vacated any such building without reasonable cause. The object of the amendment sought by her was to incorporate in her petition those requirements. There is no allegation that the prayer for amendment was not made bona fide nor that it deserved rejection for any other reason. It cannot thus be said that the Appellate Authority exercised its discretion in a capricious or arbitrary manner. Not finding any fault with the permission to amend, I reject the contention.

(3.) The only other ground on which the order of the Appellate Authority is attacked is that it had no power to remand the case. This contention is not without force (see Krishan Lal Seth v. Pritam Kumari,1961 PunLR 865 and its correctness is conceded by Mr. Majithia. The proper order for the Appellate Authority to pass in the circumstances of the case was to direct the Controller to send his report after allowing Kartar Kaur to amend her plead. ings and recording evidence over again.