INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE ETC. Vs. AMRIK SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of Amrik Singh (C.W. No. 80 of 1969) by order dated July 20, 1971.

(2.) AMRIK Singh Respondent was a permanent Constable who, on November 6, 1966, was alleged to have been carrying 4,500 milliliters of illicit liquor contained in a bladder in a cloth pack on the carrier on his cycle in the area of village Athali. This liquor was recovered from his possession by A.S.I. Malkiat Singh in the presence of Excise Inspector Kesho Dass and one Rattan Singh, a member of the public. The Respondent was sent up for trial to the court of Shri Om Parkash Singla, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Phagwara. At the trial, Rattan Singh was given up by the prosecution on the ground that he had been won over. The learned Judicial Magistrate refused to record the evidence of the other two witnesses that is, A.S.I. Malkiat Singh and Excise Inspector Kesho Dass, and acquitted the Respondent. The observations of the learned Magistrate are reproduced below:

(3.) IT was urged before the learned Single" Judge, that the Superintendent of Police, decided to hold departmental enquiry against the Respondent on the ground that this acquittal was vitiated because Ratna had been won over, that is, the Superintendent of Police sought to take action under Clause (b) and not] Clause (a) of Rule 16.3(1) of the Punjab Police Rules. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the Superintendent of Police did not form his own opinion as to the winning over of Ratna which led to the failure of the criminal charge against the Respondent. We respectfully agree with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge on this point. He, however, expressly held that the criminal charge against the Respondent could be said to have failed on a technical ground and the case was covered by Clause (a) of Rule 16.3(1), but the disciplinary action .taken against the Respondent could not be sustained because the Superintendent,, of Police did not act under that clause. We respectfully agree with the learned Single Judge, that the criminal charge against the Respondent had failed on a technical ground because the Magistrate refused to record the evidence of the two prosecution witnesses, who were available and without recording their evidence expressed the opinion that he would not convict the Respondent on their testimony. The result was that the available prosecution evidence was shut out by the Magistrate and the Respondent was acquitted, not that no evidence had been led against him but because the Magistrate refused to record any evidence in the case. The acquittal of the Respondent by the Magistrate, in these circumstances, was not only contrary . to the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure but without jurisdiction. The Magistrate had no jurisdiction to refuse to record the evidence that the prosecution intended to produce. It was not a case in which the prosecution was remiss in producing evidence and the Magistrate was not prepared to allow further opportunities. On the other hand, it was a case in which on the very first hearing the learned Magistrate refused to record the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, who were in attendance and closed the prosecution on the ground that whatever, the witnesses might say, he was not going to believe them. It is an unheard of procedure that the learned Magistrate adopted which is contrary all canons of law relating to procedure as to a trial. We, therefore, hold that in this case the criminal charge against the Respondent failed on a technical ground and disciplinary action could be taken against him under Clause (a) of Rule 16.3(1) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934.