DES RAJ Vs. MOHAN BAHADUR AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts giving rise to this petition for revision of the order of Mr. B.S. Yadav. Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 49) (hereinafter called the Act). Karnal, dated October 15, 170, are brief and are not in dispute. The application made by the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the landlords) for the eviction of Des Raj (now represented in the present proceedings by his legal representatives) under section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was allowed by the order of the Rent Controller, dated August 2, 1965, on the basis of a compromise. The consent decree passed by the Rent Controller was in the following terms: - -

(2.) THE application of the tenant was allowed by the order of Shri V.K. Jain. Rent Controller, Kaithal, dated April 30, 1970. The landlords appeal against that order was, however accepted by the order of the learned Appellate Authority already referred to on the short ground that in view of the earlier judgments of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Nathu Ram v. Ram Partap, A.I.R. 1951 (P&H) 432 and in Nanki Devi v. Ram Kishan Das : A.I.R. 1953 P&H 51, the Rent Controller could not allow the application of the tenant under section 13(4) of the Act as that part of the Rent Controller's order which directed restoration of possession to the tenant after the reconstruction of the shop was without jurisdiction.

(3.) AT the hearing of the main petition Mr. Manmohan lal Sarin, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the solitary ground on which the Appellate Authority accepted the appeal of the landlords does not hold the field in view of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (D. Falshaw and S.S. Dulat JJ., as they then were) in Mst Parbati v. Jagmandar Dass and another, I.L.R. 1961 (2) P&H 146. The learned Judges of the Division Bench expressly over -ruled the view taken by J.L. Kapur J. in Nathu Ram's case (supra) and in Nanki Devi's case (supra) and held that the words "puts that building to any use or lets it out to any tenant Other than the tenant evicted from it" in sub section (4) of section 13 of the Act would apply equally to a case where a landlord does or does not carry not the proposed reconstruction on account of which the consent of the tenant to vacate the premises was obtained. It was laid down on that basis that a compromise between the landlord and the tenant to the effect that the landlord would reconstruct the shop to be vacated by the tenant within a specified period, and restore possession of the rebuilt shop to the tenant is enforceable in execution of the decree passed on the basis of that compromise. The order was allowed to be executed in that case also an application which had been made and labelled by the tenant as the one under sub section (4) of section 13 of the Act. The only reply which Mr. Jain, Learned Counsel for the landlords, has been able to give to this argument of Mr. Sarin is that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mst. Parbati's case (supra) is not correct and needs reconsideration. I do not agree with the Learned Counsel on that point Not only am I bound by the judgment of the Division Bench in Mst. Parbati's case but I am firmly of the view that it lays down the correct law. To hold otherwise would be to lay a trap for the tenant. No Court of law or equity would allow a landlord to take undue advantage of one part of a compromise by backing out of the other which confers some benefit on the opposite party, unless there is a statutory provision compelling a Court to adopt such course. There is no such provision in this case. Even if it could be held that the language of sub section (4) of section 13 does not strictly cover a case of the present type (which was also the situation in Mst. Parbati's case as well as in the earlier two cases decided by a Single Judge) the application would be maintainable under sections 144 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore the tenant to the status quo ante from which he was made to move to his disadvantage on a representation made by the landlords which formed the subject matter of a binding decree. From whatever angle, therefore, the matter is considered, I think there is no escape from allowing this petition and setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority, and restoring therefor the decision and direction of the Kent Controller. I order accordingly.