AMAR NATH Vs. MUL RAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question which has been referred by the Division Bench to us for decision, reads thus :-

(2.) The circumstances which necessitated the making of this reference are stated in the order of reference and need not be recapitulated. The expression "sufficient cause" is not defined in the Limitation Act (No. 36 of 1963), hereinafter called the Act. It, in my opinion, means a cause which it beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of Sec. 5 of the Act. The test, whether or not a cause is sufficient, is to see whether it is a bona fide cause, inasmuch as nothing shall be taken to be done bona fide or in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. Subject to the above test, the words "sufficient cause" should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. When no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to a party for the delay in filing an appeal, it would constitute sufficient cause. Relying on several judgments and Explantion to Sec. 5 of the Act, Shri Ram Lal Aggarwal, learned counsel for Amar Nath and others, who are appellants in L. P. A. 397 of 1971, contended that the wrong practice prevailing in this Court in receiving and admitting the Letters Patent Appeals, which were not in accordance with the requirements of Rule 3 of Chapter 2-C of Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the High Court (that is, when the memorandum of appeals were not accompanied by three sets of spare paper-books) had misled the counsel in filing the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal without the said spare copies. He added that the said mistake was honest and could not be attributed to any negligence or want of good faith of the counsel who filed the appeal, much less of the appellants, and, as such, the same should be considered as "sufficient cause". I find merit in his contention. Explanation to Sec. 5 of the Act, which runs as under :- 'the fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court, in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Sec. . "

(3.) renders a practice of the High Court, which misleads an appellant or an applicant in ascertaining or computing the period of limitation, as sufficient cause under Sec. 5 for extending the prescribed period of limitation.