EDMUND N SOHUSTER Vs. ASST COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS order will dispose of Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 157-D of 1965 and 159-D of 1965. By the impugned order dated 8-2-1995 the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dismissed the revision petitions of the petitioners against the order of the Additional District Magistrate dated 2-11-1964. On 11-8-1964 the Customs authorities arrested the petitioners under Section 135 of the Customs Act. 1962. Both the petitioners were produced before the Additional District Magistrate who admitted them to bail in the sum of Rs. 10,000 with one surety in the like amount. Both the petitioners furnished sureties and were released on bail. On 28-10-1964 the petitioners filed an application requesting that the original surety bonds be substituted by bonds to be furnished by the Chartered Bank. The learned Additional District Magistrate came to the conclusion that only a natural person could execute a bond as surety and, therefore, the petitioners' application could not be allowed. This order was upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a legal person is as much competent to execute a surety bond as a natural person and, therefore, the order of the two Courts below is erroneous. He draws my attention to the definition of the word 'person' in Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code, which is in the following terms :---? "the word 'person' includes any Company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. " He then refers to Section 4, Sub-section (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which inter alia provides that "all words and expressions used herein and defined in the Indian Penal Code. (Act XLV of 1860) and not hereinbefore defined shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively attributed to them by that Code. " My attention has then been invited to Sections 499, 513 and 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code to show that there is no bar in the Code against an artificial person executing a bond as surety. It is argued that the definition of the word 'person in the Indian Penal Code has been incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of Section 4 (2) and the words "unless a different Intention appears from the subject or context" in Section 4 (1) do not control the definitions given in the Indian Penal Code as incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently, the argument proceeds that wherever the word 'person' occurs in the Criminal Procedure Code it must be given a meaning as contained in Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code. There are two answers to this contention :-- (1) It is not correct to suggest that the words "unless a different intention appears from the subject or context" in Section 4 (1) do not control the definitions incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of Section 4 (2) thereof. It is difficult to accept that the legislature intended that all the words defined in Section 4 (1) should be given that meaning unless a different intention appears while the meaning of the words defined in the Indian Penal Code and incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of Section 4 (2) should not be subjected to variation even if a different intention appears from the subject or context. In the setting sub-sec. (2) must be read as a continuation of subsection (1) as if all the words defined in the Indian Penal Code had been bodily lifted therefrom and incorporated as part of sub-section (1) after Clause (w ). When so read those words must be susceptible to variation depending on the subject or context; and (2) None of the sections, that is, Section 499 or Sections 513 to 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide that a surety bond may be executed by a person. Under Section 499 a bond is required to be executed "by one or more sufficient sureties. " The Section does not say that the bond is to be executed by a person.

(3.) IT is then contended that the word "sureties" in Section 499 must be construed to mean natural as well as artificial persons. The argument is that as a general rule both artificial and natural persons are entitled alike to do an act or a thing unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication requires it to be done by a natural person. The learned counsel draws my attention to Section 513 of the Criminal Procedure Code and points out that the intention of the Legislature as manifested therein is that a person may deposit the amount instead of executing a bond and consequently there would be no justification for holding that a surety required to execute a bond must only be a natural person. The learned counsel further Submits that no doubt sub-section (4) of Section 514 provides_ for imprisonment of a surety but that Sub-section must be limited to cases where the surety is a natural person but it cannot be used to restrict the language of Section 499 so as to permit only natural persons to execute bonds as sureties. Moreover, according to the learned counsel, the intention of the Legislature is clear from the fact that a surety is to be imprisoned only if the penalty, as mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 514, is not paid. He also seeks to supplement his argument by an illustration that in case of an accused person a bond has to be executed by him under Section 499. In case where a Corporation is being prosecuted, Section 499 will require an execution of a bond by such Corporation. In such a case the bond may be forfeited under Section 514 and penalty imposed but yet the whole of sub-section (4) of Section 514 cannot be brought into play since a Corporation is incapable of imprisonment. From this illustration the learned counsel wants me to imply that Subsection (4) is limited only to cases or bonds by natural persons.