MOHAN LAL GURDIAL DASS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant is firm Mohan Lal Gurdial Das, truck-owners of Ganga Nagar in rajasthan State It has a permit for its vehicle for Bikaner Region of Rajasthan state, and that has been countersigned by the State Transport Authority of Delhi state and the Regional Transport Authority of Ambala Region in Punjab State. The appellant-firm transports goods from Rajasthan State to Delhi State pas sing through Hissar and Rohtak Districts of Punjab State. Its vehicle is registered at ganga Nagar in Rajasthan State according to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles act. 1939 (Act 4 of 1939), and the rules thereunder. The appellant-firm has averred in its petition under Article 226 of the Constitution that although under the terms of the permit it can transport goods from or to any place within the State of Punjab, it is only passing through the areas of Punjab State while transporting goods from Ganga Nagar to Delhi without loading or unloading in areas of Punjab state. This is 'tat denied by the respondents in the return, but the position taken in the return is that, the appellant-firm because of the counter-signature of the regional Transport Authority of Ambala on its permit, becomes entitled to carry goods to and from Punjab State. This is not denied by the appellant-firm. What is specifically stated by it in its petition is that it does not do so. To this last statement there is no reply in the return that it does so.

(2.) ON October 10, 1963, a complaint was filed against the appellant firm under section 8 of the Punjab Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1902 (Punjab Act 16 of 1952) hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act', on the ground that the permit of the appellant-firm was countersigned for Ambala Region with effect from december 13. 1961. up to November 14, 1966, but its vehicle was not found registered for goods tax under the Act. Section 8 of the Act says that ''no owner shall ply his motor vehicle in the State unless he is in possession of a valid registration certificate as provided hereinafter;" and Section 17 (1) (c) of the Act provides for punishment for the offence of wilfully railing to apply for registration H is evident that under Section 8. registration certificate is requisite when owner of a motor vehicle plies it in Punjab State. If he plies his motor vehicle without such registration, he is punishable under Section 17 (1) (e ). Registration under Section 8 as is dear from Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act. is apart from registration of the motor vehicle under Act 4 of 1939. so that registration under Section 8 is only for the purposes if the Act the preamble of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for levying a tax on passengers and goods carried be road in certain motor vehicles The Act is therefore, for levy of tax on carriage of passengers and goods in certain motor vehicles Registration under Section 8 of the Act is also of such motor vehicles, that is to say motor vehicles used for carriage of passengers and goods. The present case is only concerned with the motor vehicle of the appellant firm which is a goods carrier. The question then is what is the meaning of the word 'ply' in Section 8. In The Queen v Justices of Ipswich (1889) 5 TLR 405 Lord Cole ridge. C. J. said

(3.) THE appellant-firm, is, therefore, when it is prosecuted under Section 17 (1) (e)of the Act, being prosecuted for loading or unloading of goods for carriage in this state. But the complaint, of which copy is Annexure 'a' with the petition of the appellant-firm, makes no such allegation against the appellant-firm that its motor vehicle, not having registration under Section 8 of the Act, has been plying in this state in the sense that it has been loading or unloading goods for reward in this state. The complaint does not disclose the essential allegation of fact which is the basis of the alleged offence said to have been committed by the appellant-firm and on this ground it must be quashed, for, on the face of it, it does not disclose the offence in regard to which the appellant-firm is being prosecuted.