KARNAIL SINGH AND ORS. Vs. BALWANT SINGH DHILLON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE five Petitioners, who are employees of the Mansa Roadways Private, Limited, have preferred this revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order of Shri Sewa Singh, District Judge, Bhatinda, acting as appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Appellate Authority had dismissed the appeal of these five Petitioners, but had accepted the appeals of some other employees, from the order of Shri Rattan Dev, acting as an Authority under Section 15 of the Act.

(2.) THE Respondent has raised a preliminary objection that the Authority under the Act, not being a Court subordinate to the High Court, revision under Section 115 of the Cede is incompetent and, therefore, this revision should be dismissed as such. I am unable to persuade myself to decline to hear the Petitioners in support of their grievances on this ground. It is true that this Court has taken the view that an Authority under the Act is not a Court subordinate to the High Court so as to attract this Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, but at the same time this Court has felt no difficulty in exercising its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, if the circumstances demand interference to promote the cause of justice; See Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway v. Satyender Nath Kapur Chand, I.L.R. (1963) 2 Punj. 623 :, A.I.R. 1964 Punj. 242. It is correct that there exists considerable conflict of judicial opinion in the various High Courts on this point, but this conflict has in the presence of Article 227 of the Constitution be -come, for all practical purposes purely academic. In the present case, however, it is noteworthy that from the order of the Authority under Section 15 of the Act an appeal was preferred to the District Court under Section 17 of the Act and the present revision has been preferred against the order of that Court discharging its functions as a Court of appeal. The question naturally arises whether the District Court when disposing of such an appeal functions as a Court Subordinate to the High Court or merely as a persona designata. At the bar this aspect has not at all been adverted to, with the result that I am feeling disinclined to express my considered opinion on this aspect and, therefore, I have heard the parties on the merits of the controversy to see if any infirmity is made out justifying interference under Article 227 of the Constitution or under Section 115 of the Code. I may in this connection point out that the ultimate basic purpose and object of these two provisions is not materially different, for they are both designed, to clothe this Court with power to set right the orders of the subordinate Tribunals and Courts if there is inter alia a jurisdictional infirmity resulting in failure of justice.

(3.) ON behalf of the Respondent this submission has not been controverted. The only ground on which the Respondent has tried to resist the Petitioners' challenge to the impugned order is that power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not as wide as that under Section 115 of the Code and that it is confined merely to seeing that the Tribunal in question functions within the limits of its authority. It is also argued that this in effect is even more restricted than the power conferred on this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, which extends to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. It is, on the basis of this submission, argued that the District Court has not transgressed its jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no question of keeping it within its bounds. It has also been argued that even though the District Court has observed that the appeal is incompetent, it has nevertheless considered the merits of the case and has rejected the employees' claim no merits as well.