KARAM NARAIN Vs. NARSINGH DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment will dispose of S.A.O. No. 62 -D of 1965 and S.A.O. No. 68 -D of 1965. It is common ground between the parties that the decision in S.A.O. No. 68 -D of 1965, will abide the judgment in S.A.O. No. 62 -D of 1965. I am, therefore, confining myself to the facts of the latter appeal.

(2.) NARSINGH Dass Respondent is a landlord. He filed an application for eviction of Karam Narain, tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the tenant. The said decision of the Rent Controller was affirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal by his judgment, dated 30th November, 1964. The present appeal is directed against the said judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal. Two contentions' have been raised before me : (1) the application for ejectment was barred under Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called Act No. 1), and (2) the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that the premises in question were required bona fide by the landlord is erroneous. The house in question was an evacuee property' and on 25th May, 1963, the Custodian transferred the same to the landlord, with effect from 1st October 1995. The date 1st October, 1955, was fixed in pursuance of Rule 34 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 (hereinafter called the 1955 Rules'). It is said on behalf of the tenant that under Section 14(6) of Act No. 1, a landlord who has acquired any premises by transfer cannot make an application for recovery of possession under Sub -section (1) of Section 14 on the grounds specified in Clause (e) of the proviso thereof, unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the fictional date of transfer fixed under Rule 34 of the 1955 Rules does not govern the provisions of Section 14(6) of Act No. 1 and consequently 25th May, 1962, must be taken as the date of acquisition by the landlord. It is further urged that Rule 34 of 1955 Rules is ultra vires for the following reasons and, therefore, cannot be taken into Consideration for determining the date of acquisition under Section 14(6) of Act No. I: - -

(3.) THE contention has first to be answered on the assumption that Rule 34 of 1955 Rules in valid. If that be so, the date of transfer in Section 14(6) in Act No. 1 will, in my opinion, be the date fixed by Rule 34 of Act No. 2. Rule 34 of 1955 Rules deals with the particular class of property, namely, property transferred under Chapter V of Act No. 2. The said Chapter deals with payment of compensation by transfer of acquired evacuee properties. It is not disputed that the property was transferred under the said Chapter V and that 1st October, 1955, has been correctly fixed in conformity with the said Rule 34 of 1955 -Rules. That being so, it appears to me that a fiction created by Rule 34, which is a fiction created by law, must be taken to its logical conclusion and full effect given thereto. When the law itself regulates the date of transfer and fixes it at a particular point of time, that must for the purposes of Section 14(6) of Act No. 1 also be taken as the date of transfer. No doubt, the whole thing turns on the intention of the legislature and the meaning to be assigned to the words "unless a period of five years had elapsed from the date of the acquisition" in Section 14(6) of Act No. 1. I see no justification in confining the scope of fiction under Rule 34 of 1955 Rules to the provisions of Act No. 2 only. Rule 34 by fiction makes the purchasers -transferees of the property as owners from a given date and when Section 14(6) of Act No. 1 talks of a date of acquisition, it must mean the date when the law deems the owner to have acquired the property. If 1st October, 1955 is taken as the date of acquisition, the application would be after the expiry of five years from that date and, therefore, maintainable.