FAQIR SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The dispute between the parties in this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution relates to a residential house in village Fatehabad, Tehsil Tarn Taran, District Amritsar, which was admittedly evacuee property. Both the petitioner, Faqir Singh, and Phula Singh, respondent No. 3, are displaced persons from West Pakistan having verified claims in their own names. They are also in possession of different portions of this house. These portions were, in the first instance, transferred to both of them under Rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, but on a revision having been filed by respondent No. 3, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, respondent No. 2, on 5th July, 1962 set aside both the transfers and remanded the case for determining the rights of the parties regarding the transfer of this house according to law. After remand, the petitioner was found eligible for the said transfer by the Assistant Settlement Officer on 1st February, 1963. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 went in appeal before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, who dismissed the same on 29th January, 1964. In the meantime, however, on 3rd August, 1963 Rule 30 was abrogated by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Sixth Amendment Rules, 1963. Respondent No. 3 then filed a revision before respondent No. 2, who on 5th May, 1964 accepted it and directed that the property be sold by public auction. His view was that the case had to be decided in accordance with the law that prevailed on the date of the decision of the revision petition and since Rule 30 had been abrogated, the eligibility of the parties qua the transfer of the house could not be determined under that Rule and the house had to be sold in public auction. The petitioner then filed an application to the Central Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, but the same was dismissed on 10th June, 1964. That led to the filing of the present writ petition on 28th September, 1964.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the house in dispute had been transferred in his favour by the Assistant Settlement Officer in February, 1963, while rule 30 had been abrogated in August, 1963. Consequently, its abrogation had no effect on his rights and respondent No. 3 could not take advantage of the said abrogation. His appeal and revision, therefore, became infructuous. Under these circumstances respondent No. 2 should not have set aside the order of the transfer made in the petitioner's favour.

(3.) There is no force in this contention. In Asa Nand V/s. Central Government of India and others, 1963 65 PunLR 214, I had held that when a revision under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was pending before the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the rights of the parties were in a fluid state and were not complete or finally settled. No party to the dispute could be said to have acquired a vested right in the property. Therefore, the amendment of Rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, made on 24th March, 1961 applied to the case wherein a revision was pending on that day and the decision was to be made under the amended Rule. This decision was approved by a Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 92 of 1963 (Mela Ram V/s. Government of India), decided by Dua and Khanna, JJ. on 19th February, 1664, wherein they had observed that the amended Rule was attracted up to the stage even of petitions under SEction 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that these two decisions related to the amendment in Rule 30, whereas in the instant case Rule 30 had been completely abrogated and, therefore, these rulings could not be applied to the present case. In principle, however, I find no difference if the rule is either amended or abrogated. The fact remains that the rights of the parties are in a fluid state, whenever an appeal or revision is filed by an aggrieved party and the case is to be decided in accordance with the law as it prevails on the date of the decision of these appeals and revisions. Respondent No. 3 was, admittedly, in possession of a part of this house and he could urge before the appellate or revisional authorities that the said property could not be transferred to the petitioner and he could further claim that the same had ceased to be an allotable property by virtue of the Explanation added to Rule 22 by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Sixth Amendment Rules, 1963. No interference is, therefore, called for in the impugned orders.