C DEMODAR REDDY Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of this case admit of a statement in a moderate compass. In 1931, the petitioner joined service as Assistant Accountant-General of Hyderabad and he became Secretary, Finance Department in 1949. He was appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in 1953, when, he was serving as Finance Secretary. In 1954 he was granted an ad hoc scale of Rs. 2,050-50-2,250. From 1950 to 31st October, 1956, Hyderabad was a Part B State and Andhra Pradesh came into being from 1st November, 1956. Talangana area was added to Andhra State. One part of Hyderabad was added to Mysore and the other to Maharashtra. States Reorganisation Act, 1956 , came into force from 1st November, 1956, and the old Indian Service cadre of Part B States was abolished. Transfer of territory from Hyderabad to Andhra and alteration of the name of the State of Andhra to the State of Andhra Pradesh was effected by section 3 of the States Reorganisation Act. By Sub-section (4) of Section 114 of the said Act, it was provided that cadres of each of the said services for the existing States of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Vindhya Pradesh and for the existing Part B States shall, as from the appointed day, cease to exist and the members of each of the said services borne on those cadres shall be allocated to the State cadres of the same service for the new States or for the other existing States in such manner and with effect from such date or dates as the Central Government may by order specify. Notification allocating the petitioner to the cadre of Andhra Pradesh was issued on 1st November, 1956. On 19th January, 1960, the petitioner's services were lent o Singarani Collieries Company Limited as Managing Director. On 20th January, 1961, a memorandum was served by the State of Andhra Pradesh levelling three charges against him relating to Acts and omissions during the period from August, 1955 to 1st November, 1936. On 22nd March, 1961, the petitioner filed an explanation and raised a legal objection that the Andhra Pradesh State was not competent under rule 4 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, to initiate, institute or conduct any disciplinary proceedings. On 12th April, 1961, the petitioner filed an additional written statement dealing with the merits of the charges and by G.O. No. 652, dated 9th May, 1961, Mr. Raghavan, a retired Indian Civil Servant, was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The inquiry was commenced on 4th July, 1961, and concluded on 17th September, 1961. The legal objection regarding the competency of Andhra Pradesh to initiate the proceedings was referred to the Central Government by the State and the Central Government expressed the opinion that the State of Andhra Pradesh was competent to frame charges and to institute disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in respect of the matters covered by the present inquiry. The report was made by the Inquiry Officer on 30th September, 1961, holding the petitioner guilty under charges 1 and 2 and not guilty under charge 3. Broadly. the charges were for violation of rule 3 of All India Service Conduct Rules, 1954, which requires every member of the service to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. The Union of India issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 2nd April, 1962, calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The petitioner furnished an explanation in reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner was dismissed on 21st November, 1962. Two points have been urged by Mr. Narsa Raju, in support of the petition; (1) The entire proceedings are void inasmuch as the Government of Andhra Pradesh was not competent and had no jurisdiction to initiate and conduct proceedings; and (2) Report of findings of the Inquiry Officer is vitiated because (a) the findings are based on no evidence and (b) they are perverse inasmuch as no judicial mind could come to the conclusion on the materials on the record at which the Inquiry Officer arrived. Regarding the first point the argument of Mr. Narsa Raju, is based on the construction of rule 4 of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and sections 119 to 121 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 . Clauses (a) and (b) of rule 4 are as under :-

(2.) Mr. Narsa Raju submits that clause (a) refers to such Government servants as were in the Government service at the time of omission or commission of the alleged act, but had not become members of the Service which according to clause (c) of rule 2 means the Indian Administrative Service or the Indian Police Service, as the case may be. Clause (b), according to him, refers to an omission or commission by a member of the Indian Administrative Service. He says that under clause (b) of rule 4, which is applicable to this case, the Government under whom such member was serving at the time of commission or omission was alone competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against him. Since he was serving under the Government of Part B State of Hyderabad at the relevant time and that State having ceased to exist no other State could initiate proceedings. He emphasises that the words "shall alone be competent" - and "the Government under whom he is serving at the time of the institution of such proceedings shall be bound to render all reasonable facilities to the Government instituting and conducting such proceedings" conclusively show that Hyderabad State, alone could take proceedings for the alleged omissions and commissions. He further points out that section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 , provides that re-adjustment in the territories made by part II of the said Act, shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies and territorial references in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day. The only effect of this provision is that the said rule 4(b) continues to apply in the territories which merged in Andhra Pradesh, Mysore and Maharashtra. But since rule 4(b) in terms requires only Hyderabad State to initiate proceedings the reserving provision of section 119 cannot have the effect of conferring jurisdiction on Andhra Pradesh State to initiate proceedings. He further points out that though under section 120 of the States Reorganisation Act, the appropriate Government could within one year from the appointed day make adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient, no such adaptation or modification was made with respect to rule 4(b) under the said provision, Mr. Narsa Raju then draws my attention to section 121 of the States Re-organisation Act and submits that even though the authority required or empowered to enforce rule 4(b) was for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to Andhra Pradesh, competent to construe the law in such manner, without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before it, it could not in exercise of power under section 121 redraft or re-write the said rule. He says that to assume jurisdiction by virtue of section 121 to initiate proceedings the authority concerned will have to recast the whole rule and particularly delete the word "alone" and also a good part of rule 4(b) requiring the other Government to render all facilities to the Government instituting or conducting the proceedings. Such rewriting would not, according to Mr. Narsa Raju, be covered by the expression "construe the law in such manner -------- as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the ------- authority" in section 121. It would be convenient here to set out the provisions of sections 119 to 121 which are as under :

(3.) Mr. Shankar, on the other hand, refers to rule 22 of the said Rules and says that the Central Government has already decided that the State of Andhra Pradesh was competent to take proceedings and that decision, according to rule 22, is final. In the alternative he submits that the object of the Legislature in enacting sections 119 to 121 vis-a-vis disciplinary proceedings was that no guilty person should go unpunished. That, according to him, could be the only object of extending rule 4(b) by section 119. I must confess that the matter is not free from difficulty. So far as rule 22 is concerned, there is no force in Mr. Shankar's argument. There is no controversy between the parties as to the interpretation of rule 4(b). The controversy revolves round the construction to be placed on the provisions of sections 119 to 121 of the States Reorganisation Act. No finality could, in the circumstances, be attached to the decision of the Central Government. Moreover, the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to construe the rules and determine the rights of the parties flowing therefrom cannot be affected or cut down by Rule 22.