C DEMODAR REDDY Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of this case admit of a statement in a moderate compass. In 1931, the Petitioner joined service as Assistant Accountant-General of Hyderabad and he became Secretary, Finance Department, in 1949. He was appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in 1953, when he was serving as Finance Secretary. In 1954 he was granted an ad hoc scale of Rs. 2,050--50--2,250. From 1950 to 31st October, 1956, Hyderabad was a Part B State and Andhra Pradesh came into being from 1st November, 1956. Talangana area was added to Andhra State. One part of Hyderabad was added to Mysore and the other to Maharashtra. States Reorganisation Act, 1956, came into force from 1st November, 1956, and the old Indian Service cadre of Part B States was abolished. Transfer of territory from Hyderabad to Andhra and alteration of the name of the State of Andhra to the State of Andhra Pradesh was effected by Section 3 of the States Reorganisation Act. By Sub-section (4) of Section 114 of the Said Act it was provided that cadres of each of the said services for the existing States of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh. Punjab and Vindhya Pradesh and for the existing Part B States shall, as from the appointed day cease to exist and the members of each of the said services borne on those cadres shall be allocated to the State cadres of the same service for the new States or for the other existing States in such manner and with effect from such date or dates as the Central Government may by order specify. Notification allocating the Petitioner to the cadre of Andhra Pradesh was issued on 1st November, 1956. On 19th January, 1960, the Petitioner's services were lent to Singarani Collieries Company Limited as Managing Director. On 20th January 1961. a memorandum was served by the State of Andhra Pradesh levelling three charges against him relating to acts and omissions during the period from August, 1955 to 1st November, 1956. On 22nd March, 1961, the Petitioner filed an explanation and raised a legal objection that the Andhra Pradesh State was not competent under Rule 4 of the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 1955, to initiate, institute or conduct any disciplinary proceedings. On 12th April, 1961, the Petitioner filed an additional written statement dealing with the merits of the charges and by G.O. No. 652, dated 9th May, 1961. Mr. Raghavan, a retired Indian Civil Servant, was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The inquiry was commenced on 4th July, 1961, and concluded on 17th September. 1961. The legal objection regarding the competency of Andhra Pradesh to initiate the proceedings was referred to the Central Government by the State and the Central Government expressed the opinion that the State of Andhra Pradesh was competent to frame charges and to institute disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner in respect of the matters covered by the present inquiry. The report was made by the Inquiry Officer on 30th September, 1961 holding the Petitioner guilty under charges 1 and 2 and not guilty under charge 3. Broadly, the charges were for violiation of Rule 3 of All-India Service Conduct Rules, 1954, which requires every member of the service to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. The Union of India issued a show-cause notice to the Petitioner on 2nd April, 1962, calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The Petitioner furnished an explanation in reply to the show-cause notice. The Petitioner was dismissed on 21st November, 1962. Two points have been urged by Mr. Narsa Raju, in support of the petition (1) The entire proceedings are void inasmuch as the Government of Andhra Pradesh was not competent and had no jurisdiction to initiate and conduct proceedings and (2) Report of findings of the Inquiry Officer is vitiated because (a) the findings are based on no evidence, and (b) they are perverse inasmuch as no judicial mind could come to the conclusion on the materials on the record at which the Inquiry Officer arrived. Regarding the first point the argument of Mr. Narsa Raju, is based on the construction of Rule 4 of All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and Sections 119 to 121 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 . Clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 4 are as under:

(2.) Mr. Shankar, on the other hand, refers to Rule 22 of the said Rules and says that the Central Government has already decided that the State of Andhra Pradesh was competent to take proceedings and that decision, according to Rule 22, is final. In the alternative he submits that the object of the Legislature in enacting Sections 119 to 121 vis-a-vis disciplinary proceedings was that no guilty person should go unpunished. That, according to him, could be the only object of extending Rule 4(b) by Section 119. I must confess that the matter is not free from difficulty. So far as Rule 22 is concerned, there is no force in Mr. Shankar's argument. There is no controversy between the parties as to the interpretation of Rule 4(b). The controversy revolves round the construction to be placed on the provisions of Sections 119 to 121 of the States Reorganisation Act. No finality could, in the circumstances, be attached to the decision of the Central Government. Moreover, the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to construe the rules and determine the rights of the parties flowing therefrom cannot be affected or cut down by Rule 22.

(3.) Now, I come to the main question as to the interpretation of Sections 119 to 121 of the States Reorganisation Act. It is clear from the said provisions that the intention of the Legislature was to keep intact the laws that prevailed in the merged territories. The effect of Section 119 would be that the law that prevailed in that part of Hyderabad which merged with Andhra Pradesh would continue to apply in that part of the merged territory not withstanding the fact that a different law in that behalf be in force in the rest of Andhra Pradesh. To give one example, if sale of certain commodity was subject to sales-tax in Hyderabad, but exempt in Andhra Pradesh the sales-tax would continue to be leviable on sales effected in the merged territories till, of course, a different provision is made by the Legislature or other competent authority. The meaning to be given to Section 119, therefore, is that the Legislature applied its mind to every law which was in force in Hyderabad and said that that law shall continue to apply to that territory notwithstanding the merger. It follows that the Legislature also applied its mind to Rule 4(b) and provided by Section 119 that Rule 4(b) will continue to apply in the territory which merged in Andhra Pradesh. It was suggested by Mr. Narsa Raju that Section 119 had no applicability so far as Rule 4(b) was concerned because Rule 4(b) was already in force in whole of India and was, therefore, not applied to the merged territory by virtue of Section 119. I do not find myself in argreement with this submission. Section 119 was applicable to all laws in force in Hyderabad even if they were applicable in the rest of India. Consequently Rule 4(b) would apply to the merged territory by virtue of Section 119 and not because it was applicable to whole of India. To take the case at hand, if Section 119 were not there Mr. Narsa Raju could have legitimately said that Rule 4(b) requires a particular State to initiate proceedings and since it has not been extended to the new State no action can be taken by the new State. Section 119, therefore, particularly when read with Sections 120 and 121, shows that the intention of the Legislature was to extend all those laws mutatis mutandis to the territories which went to a new State as a result of reorganisation. In any case, even if it be held that Rule 4(b) continued to apply to the merged territory because it was applicable to whole of India, it cannot be lost sight of that Section 119 at least preserved the applicability of those laws and restated that they shall continue to apply in the merged territory. The intention of the Legislature thus clearly appears to be that they after applying their mind to all such laws said "whether they be applicable to whole of India or only the merged territroies, they shall continue to apply." The Courts are very often driven to ascertain the legislative purpose for ascertaining the meaning and scope of a particular enactment. Such enquiry is in reality directed to discovering the legislative intent. The legislative purpose is the reason why the particular enactment was passed. The reason may be to remedy some existing evil, or to correct some defect in existing law or to create a new right or a new remedy. Consequently in seeking to ascertain the legislative purpose, the Courts do resort, among other things, to the circumstances existing at the time of the law's enactment, to the necessity for the law and the evil intended to be cured by it, to the intended remedy, to the law prior to the new enactment and to the consequences of the construction urged. These various indications of the legislative purpose do not directly reveal the legislative intent or meaning, but only the reason for such enactment. Nevertheless the legislative purpose may be a step in ascertaining the legislative intent or meaning, since the reason for enactment of a law must necessarily shed a considerable light on both, for if the law-makers sought to effect a certain purpose, naturally such purpose should reveal the meaning of the language used. When construing a statute, therefore, the reasons for its enactment are not to be ignored. A statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. The Courts should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it. Of course, when there is no ambiguity in. the language, the statute must be accorded the expressed meaning and no deviation should be called for. Even when a statute is ambiguous, considerable caution should be exercised by the Courts lest its opinion should be substituted for the intent of the legislature. The distinction between legislative purpose and legislative intent should always be kept in mind. The legislative purpose is instrumental in determining that the statute's construction shall be by indicating the meaning of its language and the meaning thus reached reveals what was intended by the law-makers. In the light of the above what emerges clearly is that the purpose of Sections 119 to 121 in relation to Rule 4(b) was to provide remedies in the matter of enquires against the delinquents and that acceptance of the Petitioner's contention would, without doubt, defeat the purpose of the Legislature. Having ascertained the purpose of the law-makers and deduced their intention therefrom the statue has to be interpreted having regard to the same. If Mr. Narsa Raju's arguments were accepted, it would mean that although the Legislature applied Rule 4(b) to the merged territories, they did so knowing full well that it is not going to have any effect. That intention can never be attributed to the Legislature. That then takes me to Section 121 of the said Act. The authority concerned with the enforcement of said Rule 4(b) must, therefore, construe it having regard to the aforementioned intention of the Legislature. A difficulty did present itself to my mind that if the State of Andhra Pradesh could initiate proceedings under Rule 4(b) it may be possible to say that other newly formed States, with which parts of Hyderabad were merged, could also initiate similar proceedings. That would be so because if the authorities in Andhra Pradesh could say that they will construe Rule 4(b) in such manner as may be necessary to facilitate its application in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh the authorities in Mysore and Maharashtra could also say that the acts alleged were committed by the Petitioner when he was serving under the Government of Hyderabad and since part of Hyderabad had merged with Mysore or Maharashtra and Rule 4(b) made applicable thereto, they would so construe Rule 4(b) and hold that they were competent to initiate proceedings. It may be said that under Rule 4(b) the place where the act was committed does not have any bearing because under Rule 4(b) it is the Government of the State under whom he was serving at the relevant time and not of the place where irregularity or illegality was committed that is competent to take action and the offence having been committed when the Petitioner was serving Hyderabad, any of the three new States, that is, Mysore. Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, could initiate proceedings. If Rule 4(b) fixed the authority to take action with reference to the territory where the offence was committed, the matter would have been simple. Then wherever such territory went, that State would have been competent to take action. As the Rule 4(b) stands, it may be difficult to say which of the three States could initiate proceedings. Mr. Shankar tried to rely on the definition of "principal successor State" as contained in Section 2(m) of the States Reorganisation Act, and submitted that Andhra Pradesh being the principal successor State in relation to the existing State of Hyderabad, it alone was competent to take action. The validity of this contention is also not free from doubt because the expression "principal successor State" does not occur in Sections 119 to 121 at all. Reference to Section 2 would show that the term defined in the Act may have to be given that meaning wherever it occurs in the Act. For instance the term "principal successor State" is used in Section 87.