HIRA LAL Vs. SHRIMATI SHARBATI DEVI AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON the death of Din Dayal, some -time in 1938, his land was mutated half in the name of his son Hira Lal Plaintiff, who was then minor, from his wife named Basanti, and the other half in the name of his daughter -in -law Sharbati Devi Defendant, being widow of a predeceased son, from another wife of his named Mathri. It has not been denied that since then Sharbati Devi Defendant remained in joint possession of the land.

(2.) IT appears that by about 1950, Hira Lal Plaintiff became major, for in that year he instituted a suit against Sharbati Devi Defendant to recover the land. In that suit, there was a compromise between them resulting in consent decree of May 9. 1951, whereby Hira Lal Plaintiff was declared as the sole heir and owner of the land left by Din Dayal, and Sharbati Devi Defendant was given possession of the land in dispute in the present litigation and certain other land for life, her rights being restricted with regard to alienation. On September 14, 1956, she sold 4 Kanals and 3 Marlas of land to Khem Ram Defendant for Rs. 200.

(3.) IT has been urged on behalf of the Plaintiff, that when on the death of her father -in -law in 1938, half of the land left by him was mutated in the name of Sharbati Devi Defendant and she went in joint possession of it, it cannot be said that she had that land in lieu of her maintenance. The reason given is quite simple, it is this, that Hira Lal Plaintiff was at the time a minor, that there is no evidence that any guardian of his acted on his behalf in giving possession of the land to Sharbati Devi Defendant in lieu of maintenance, and that there is no evidence whatsoever that anybody else did so or could do so on behalf of the Plaintiff. This is factually true. Under the Hindu Law a pre -deceased son's widow has no right to any property from the estate of her deceased father -in -law, but paragraph 564 in Mulla's Hindu Law, 12th Edition, says that "On the death, however, of the father -in -law, his son, widow, or other heir inheriting his property, comes under a legal obligation to carry out this moral obligation, and to maintain her out of such property. In other words, on the death of the father -in -law, the moral obligation on him to maintain his daughter -in -law ripens into a legal obligation on his heirs inheriting his estate in accordance with the principle stated in Article 544" - -and that article says "an heir is legally bound to provide, out of the estate which descends to him, maintenance for those persons whom the late proprietor was legally or morally bound to maintain. The reason is that the estate is inherited subject to the obligation to provide for such maintenance." A widowed daughter -in -law is, therefore, entitled to -maintenance from the estate of her deceased father -in -law, but she cannot claim a right in that estate, in other words, she cannot claim to share that estate. No doubt the right to maintenance is a legal right, but it still does not extend to giving her a share in the estate. So it is obvious that Sharbati Devi Defendant was only entitled to maintenance from the estate of her deceased father -in -law Din Dayal. She could not claim a right to any share of property left by him, including the land in dispute. Undoubtedly she came in possession of the land in 1938 in consequence of a mutation attested in her favour after the death of her father -in -law, and half of the land from the inheritance of her deceased father -in -law was mutated in her name. It is not denied that she took joint possession of that land. But it has been pointed out that Hira Lal Plaintiff was at the time a minor and could not and in fact did not enter into any contract with her to give that land to her in lieu of maintenance. No guardian of his did so. No other person, who could bind him, did so. In what circumstances the revenue authorities attested the mutation of the land in her favour is not clear. But if they did so on their own account, it would not mean that the land was given to her in lieu of maintenance by or on behalf of Hira Lal Plaintiff. She herself could not, whether by force or for inaction of somebody, enter into possession of the land and declare herself to have obtained the land in lieu of maintenance. It is thus obvious that when she first came in possession of the land in 1938, whether her possession was in the strict sense unlawful or not, by no stretch of imagination can it be said to have been given to her by or on behalf of Hira Lal Plaintiff in lieu of maintenance. At that time she acquired no estate or property in land by merely going in possession of it. The argument on the side of the Defendants in this respect cannot possibly prevail.