ABDUL GHANI Vs. KHARAITI RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are four connected revision petitions arising out of two cases in the following circumstances : two tenants Kishan Chand, the proprietor of the firm called Kishan Chand Raja Ram and Khairati Ram, occupying different premises owned by the present petitioner, Abdul Ghani, filed applications in the Court of a Sub Judge at Delhi under section 8 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act XXXVIII of 1952 for the fixation of the standard rent of the premises occupied by them. In both cases the landlord raised the preliminary objection that the applications did not lie since the standard rent of the premises in dispute had already been fixed in proceedings between the parties under the earlier Act, the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act of 1947, which was repealed and replaced by the Act of 1952. The learned Subordinate Judge dealing with the cases overruled this objection and fixed a date for proceeding with the cases on their merits. Being uncertain as to whether this order was appealable or not, the landlord both instituted revision petitions district in this Court and also appeals in the Court of the District Judge. The Additional District has disposed of the two appeals by upholding the decision of the trial Court, and so revision petitions have also been filed against those decisions.

(2.) It is agreed that the premises now in dispute were first let after the 2nd of June, 1944 and so are covered by clause (b). In support of his contention that the fixation of the standard rent in proceedings between the parties under the earlier Act of 1947 is a bar to reopening the matter under the new Act and learned counsel for the petitioner relies principally on the provisions of section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act X of 1897, ("Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter be made, then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repeated"), and on the provisions of section 46(2) of the new Act itself, Section 46 (I) merely states that the Act of 1947 is hereby repealed, and sub-section (2) reads-

(3.) It is contended that if, as would seem to be the case under the above provisions, proceedings had been pending under the old Act between the present parties for the fixation of the standard rent of the premises, the decision would still have to be according to the provisions of the Act of 1947, although the later Act had superseded it, and it would make nonsense of the whole matter if on the day following the decision according to the provisions of the 1947 Act the tenant could again come to the Court under section 8 of the new Act. This argument is undoubtedly one which needs serious consideration, but at the same time there appear to be at least equally good arguments for the opposite point of view.