HUKUM SINGH SHIBBA Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Civil Writs Nos. 242, 307 and 311 of 1954 are connected and the only question we are considering in these cases is the constitutional validity of certain provisions of Punjab Act 1 of 1954 (The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. This Act, as its preamble shows is designed to regulate the rights in 'shamilat deh' and 'abadi deh'. Section 3 of the Act says:

(2.) Mr. Tek Chand who argued the petitioners' case before us raised two arguments in this connection. He first contended that the Act in dispute does not fall within the terms of Article 31-A, it being, according to learned counsel, not a law providing for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate. The term "extinguishment" appearing in Article 31-A of the Constitution, according to learned counsel means the total abolition of a right known to law in the same manner as slavery has been abolished in most civilized countries and does not merely mean the extinguishment of a particular person's right in certain property or the transfer of that right to another person. The argument is interesting but not in my opinion substantial. According to Mr. Tek Chand a law which provides for the total abolition of the rights of ownership of landed property, for instance, would be constitutional as it would, according to him, fall under Article 31-A, but if the right of ownership of a person or a group of persons is merely extinguished 'qua' those persons and the same right is vested in some other person that would not fall within the Article. I find it impossible to agree that the expression "extinguishment" has been used in Article 31-A of the Constitution in the special sense suggested by the learned counsel. It is significant that Article 31-A speaks of acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights in an estate and then speaks of the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate and I find no ground for thinking that if a person's rights in an estate have been taken away hum him and given to another person this would riot be distinguishing those rights. In my opinion, therefore, the impugned Act does fall within the meaning of Article 31-A of the Constitution as it provides for the extinguishment of certain rights in certain property belonging to the village proprietors and also for the modification of those rights.

(3.) Mr. Tek Chand's second argument was that in any case the impugned Act merely has the effect of extinguishing or modifying certain rights in certain pieces of land but it docs not provide for the extinguishment or modification of any right in any estate, the contention being that an estate under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, Section 3, means any area for which a separate record of rights has been made or which has been so assessed to land revenue, and that the extinguishment or modification must be of particular rights in the whole of such area and not merely in a part of it. Thus according to Mr. Tek Chand a part of an estate like the 'shamilat deh' in a village would not be any estate and the extinguishment or modification of any right in such part of any estate would not be covered by Article 31-A. Once again, I am unable to agree. There are in an estate several kinds of rights owned by various persons and one of such rights is the right of proprietorship in the village 'shamilat' and when, therefore, the impugned Act provides for the extinguishment of such ownership rights it clearly provides for the extinguishment or modification of certain rights in an estate, Mr. Tek Chand's argument that a part of an estate is not an estate appears to have been raised before a Full Bench of this Court in connection with the validity of another statute and it was on that occasion repelled by the Full Bench. Khosla J. who delivered the main judgment in that case, -- 'Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab', AIR 1954 Punj 167 (FB) (A), observed in connection with this argument;