SHRIMATI JASWANTI DEVI Vs. HARBANS LAL BHATIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition raises the question whether it is within the competence of a Court of law to determine the standard rent of premises even though the period within which an application for its determination can be made has already expired.

(2.) In appears that Shrimati Jaswanti Devi is the owner of a certain house situate in Delhi while Shri Harbans Lal is her tenant. It is common ground that this house was constructed many years ago, that it was let out for the first time in the year, 1950 and that it was let out to Harbans Lal in the year 1951 at a rent of Rs. 88 per mensem. On the 8th June, 1953 the landlord brought a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent against the tenant at the stipulated rate of Rs. 88 per mensem, but the tenant objected to this charge on the ground that the landlord was precluded by the provisions of section 4 of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act of 1952 from charging any rent in excess of the standard rent. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the question of standard rent could not be examined at that stage as no application for the determination thereof was made with the period prescribed under the provisions of section 11 and decreed the plaintiff's suit at the stipulated rate. The Senior Subordinate Judge, however, came to a contrary conclusion. He held that it was the duty of the Court to examine the question of standard rent and to grant a decree for rent in accordance with the provisions of section 4. The case was accordingly remanded to the trial Court for redecision in accordance with the provisions of law. The landlord is dissatisfied with the order and has come to this Court in revision.

(3.) Section 4 of the Act of 1952 declares in unambiguous language that rent in excess of standard rent cannot be recovered and imposes by implication a statutory obligation on the Court to refrain from passing a decree for rent in excess of the standard rent. If standard rent has already been determined under the provisions of section 8 no difficulty presents itself, for the Court has merely to calculate the rent for the period of occupation and to pass a decree in accordance with this calculation. But what is the Court to do if the application for fixation of the standard rent is barred by time and standard rent has not been determined. The answer is furnished by section 2(1) of the statute which declares that standard rent in relation to any premises means-