PUPPY PESTICIDES Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition has been filed under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of Criminal complaint bearing No.COMA/15/2018 dtd. 5/3/2018 titled as State of Punjab Vs. M/s. Puppy Pesticides and Others under Sec. 27(5) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 for violation of Ss. 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (for short the Act') and also summoning order dtd. 1/3/2018 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib alongwith all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that on 25/3/2010, the Agricultural Development Officer, Block Amloh, District Fatehgarh Sahib visited the premises of the petitioner and took sample of Phorate 10% (G) granules from the original packing and after taking the sample and dividing it into three parts, one part of the sample was sent for analysis to the Insecticide Quality Control Laboratory, Amritsar. Thereafter on 29/3/2010, the said sample was found to be misbranded and on the basis of the said report, the present complaint dtd. 27/2/2018 was brought in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and consequently on 1/3/2018, summoning orders were issued to the petitioners. He further contends that it is an admitted fact that the sample drawn was from the Dealer i.e. from the Company's original packing as the petitioner is not the manufacturer. The petitioner was selling the insecticide in sealed containers in original form as obtained from the registered manufacturer i.e. United Phosphorus Limited i.e. Vapi Gujarat through M/s. Swal Corporation Limited, Mumbai. He further contends that since the petitioner is only a dealer, he could not be prosecuted for misbranding of the sealed containers as the dealer and Distributor are not liable for misbranding of the said insecticide. The liability, if any, is on the manufacturer.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners further contends that as per provisions of Sec. 470 Cr.P.C, the period for obtaining sanction for prosecution from the date of its application (i.e. 10/6/2013) till the date of its grant (i.e. 7/4/2017) has to be exempted from the period of limitation. The grant of sanction for prosecution was applied to the competent authority on 10/6/2013 and the sanction for the same was accorded on 7/4/2017 which took 03 years and 10 months after it was applied for. The sanction request to the competent authority was applied for after more than a period of 03 years from the date of sample having been found to be misbranded i.e. 29/3/2010. Furthermore, the prosecution eventually was launched on 1/3/2018 after the lapse of more than 11 months from the grant of sanction from the higher authority. It is argued that even if the period of grant of sanction for prosecution from the date of its application till its grant is excluded from the period of limitation, even then also the case is found to be barred by limitation.