HARBANS SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India making prayer for setting aside the order dtd. 8/8/2024 (Annexure P-3), passed by the respondent No. 2, whereby, the case of the petitioner for premature release, as per the policy dtd. 8/7/1991 (Annexure P-1), had been declined. He has also made prayer for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus by directing the respondents to release him prematurely on the ground that as per conditions of the aforementioned policy, he has already undergone his sentence.

(2.) As submitted in the petition, the petitioner had been held guilty and convicted for commission of offence punishable under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'), vide judgment of conviction and order on quantum of sentence dtd. 15/10/2009, passed in case arising out of FIR No. 23 dtd. 7/6/2007, registered under Ss. 302, 34 and 342 of IPC at Police Station Joga, Punjab and had been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The petitioner had filed an appeal before this Court against his conviction, which had been dismissed, vide judgment dtd. 22/4/2015 passed in CRA-D-1032-DB-2009.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 2 is not sustainable in the eyes of law as while passing the same, it was ignored that the period of parole granted to the petitioner was to be added in actual custody period for the purpose of computing his total sentence undergone by him. As per custody certificate filed today, the petitioner had undergone actual sentence of 08 years, 07 months and 05 days. He had been granted concession of parole for a period of 02 years, 05 months and 20 days. A perusal of the impugned order would show that the claim of the petitioner had been rejected only on the ground that he had not completed actual sentence of 10 years as required under the aforesaid policy. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the authority cited as Inderjit Singh @ Lada vs. State of Punjab and others, 2025(1) RCR (Criminal) 307, wherein it has been that for the purpose of premature release of a convict, the period of parole availed by him must be counted towards his actual sentence but must be deducted from his total sentence which includes remissions. Hence, the actual sentence of the petitioner comes to 11 years and 25 days if the parole period is included. Therefore, it is urged that the present petition deserves to be allowed, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the petitioner deserves to be granted benefit of premature release.