EVERGREEN SR. SECONDARY SCHOOL Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Learned counsel for the respondent-Organization submits that there were two periods involved in this case with respect to assessment. The first period was from September 2004 to March 2005 which suffered an order under Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 [for short 'the Act'] against which the petitioner is in appeal before the Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. Further proceedings against the School are stated to have been stayed in the pending appeal. The second period of assessment involves April 2005 to August 2009 which also has suffered an order under Section 7-A of the Act but which has not been appealed against by the Petitioner-School and is presently final.

(2.) For the latter periodunder Section 14-B of the Act was taken out by the Organization to quantify damages which has led to the passing of the impugned order against which the present petition has been filed. The order under Section 14-B was passed on May 12, 2011. The petitioner had entered appearance and contested the case but for several dates including the day when the final order was passed, the schoolManagement was not present in person or through its representative or through counsel.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner admits that the impugned order came to the knowledge of the school on June 02, 2011 and the appeal was filed on September 23, 2011 against it. The procedure for filing appeals is laid down in Rule 7 of the Employees' Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 which lays down that any person aggrieved by a notification or an order passed by the Central Government under the Act can be appealed against within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, and prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. The first proviso to Rule 7 gives a latitude to the Tribunal in cases where sufficient cause is shown which prevented party to prefer an appeal within the prescribed period, and to that extent, if it is satisfied, the period of limitation by a further period of 60 days can be accommodated statutorily with reasonable explanation for the delay in approaching the Tribunal. There can be no doubt that from the date of knowledge both the periods have expired, in the first and the second leg. The moot question is from what point limitation would run in this case.