DARSHAN SINGH AND ORS. Vs. AMARJIT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff who filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 16.3.1995 was successful in securing a decree for specific performance. The defence was that the plaintiff had not been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the plaintiff was not present on the date when the balance sale consideration had to be paid, namely on 31.5.1995. The suit itself had been filed on 17.1.1996 i.e. nearly 7 months later after issuing a notice on 14.1.1996. Both the parties were fencing on mutual assertions of the other being responsible for the breach of the contract. The plaintiff gave evidence in court that he was present at the Register's office on 31.5.1995, but the defendants were not, while the defendants contended that they were actually present and got their own affidavits prepared and attested by the registering officer. The plaintiff joined the issue to explain the lack of such similar evidence of the affidavit being attested by the Registering officer stating that he did not know of such procedure as possible.

(2.) THE trial court decreed the suit finding that the plaintiff had proved his willingness and readiness and the defendants were actually setting up a new story that they actually were present at the time when the document was to be registered on 31.5.1995 and that they went to the plaintiff's house the next date and called upon him to perform his part of the contract and only when he failed to do so, they left for U.K. This aspect of the evidence was found to be not genuine and the decree of specific performance was granted which was affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Court.

(3.) THE defendants' contention is that the property is situated in an urban area and the prices have gone several time fold, therefore, the specific performance ought not be granted. According to them, the only appropriate relief would be damages and not specific performance. The learned Senior Counsel would refer me to the decision in Nanjappan Versus Ramasamy and another, AIR 2015 (SCW) P. 1659 and Satya Jain (D) thr. Lrs. and others Versus Anis Ahmed Rushdie (D) Thr. Lrs. and others : 2013 AIR (SC) 434 to state that the appropriate relief would be only damages. I must point out that the proposition pleaded by the Senior Counsel is wide off the mark. It will be disastrous consequence for plaintiff to be punished in every case because of the systemic delay that we ever experience in every civil litigation in India. A mere delay that cannot be attributed to a plaintiff's conduct cannot be a ground made against the interest of the plaintiff. In Nanjappan's case the court was finding that the agreement had been executed about 23 years earlier. The court was making reference to the earlier decision taken in Sardar Singh V. Smt. Krishna Devi, 1994 (2) R.R.R. 391 where the court reminded as a measure of prudent practice that jurisdiction for decreeing the specific performance is a discretion and would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the agreement had been executed in the year 1987. The Supreme Court was holding that the case involved an advance Rs. 25,000/ - as having been paid by the plaintiff and the balance was payable within a period of 2 -1/2 years thereafter to get the sale deed executed. There was a second agreement of sale executed on 21.3.1990 where it was stated that the plaintiff was unable to pay the balance within the stipulated period and get the sale deed executed and, therefore, a second sale agreement was executed providing for further period of three years. The Court was finding that from the recital in the second agreement itself, it was evident that the plaintiff was unable to pay the balance to get the sale deed executed. It was in that context that the conduct of the parties was relevant to deny him the specific performance and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act itself provides that the relief will not be extended merely because it was lawful to do so. In the judgment in Satya Jain (Supra) again, it was not merely a case of escalation of prices during over the period of time. The Court had found that litigation ensued between the parties lasted for about 40 years for the no fault of vendee. The Court was holding that no straight jacket formula could be laid down as regards readiness and willingness and it will depend on over all conduct of the parties before and subsequent to the filing of the suit. The Court was only disposing of the case directing the trial court to re -determine the value and remitted the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration as regards determination of value. A discretion that is vested in courts to grant and not to grant the relief ought not be understood as not merely to grant the relief. In Indian experience, no case comes for admission to either the High Court or the Supreme Court before 20 years of trial and the appellate court proceedings. I cannot see the judgment in Satya Jain (supra) to expound a proposition of what is now being canvassed before me that if there has been delay, the courts will direct re -determination of prices. Re -determination of prices of what the Supreme Court thought was essentially where the case was pending more than 40 years where the Courts had directed notice to be issued in appeal and took up the case for hearing a year later I should be in the first place convinced that there is something substantial for consideration in appeal on a point of law. The only law made is that the courts will not order for specific performance in relation to urban properties where litigation has progressed for 20 years, I am afraid that we are trying to bring a new proposition which does not exist.