(1.) THE petitioner has approached this court claiming a direction to the respondents to provide her compassionate appointment in any of the Departments of the Government of Punjab including her late father's parent department. Her father had served as a constable in the Punjab Police and died of illness in the year 1986 when she was two years of age. The petitioner attained the age of majority in 2003 when her mother made an application to the Head of the Police Department that her daughter's case be considered for ex -gratia employment in terms of the then existing scheme. That request made on November 21, 2002 was considered and vide an order passed by the Director General of Police, Punjab addressed to the Additional Director General of Police, P.A.P., Jalandhar Cantt. with the copy endorsed to the petitioner her case was rejected. It is not the case either before the Government or in the present petition that the petitioner was not communicated the order adverse to her interest. There is a printing error in the petition which the counsel is not able to reconcile as the date of the order rejecting the case of the petitioner has been appended as Annexure P -3 with the date December 24, 2003 but the index records the date December 22, 2007. The difference is hardly of any significance in the determination of the case.
(2.) THE present petition has been filed in 2014 on the strength of a policy circular dated July 03, 2008 which provides as follows: -
(3.) SO far as the question of delay and laches is concerned in approaching this court belatedly, I would only say that though the application was made without delay on attaining the age of majority but Government rejected the request either on December 24, 2003 or December 22, 2007 and even when either of the dates is taken as the cause of action even then limitation to bring a suit expired at about the end of the year 2010. The adverse order has been challenged in this petition in the year 2014 for the first time. The Supreme Court has guided courts that where limitation to bring a suit has run out then ordinarily a writ petition would not be entertained. This is the view of the Constitution Bench in State of M.P. vs. Bhailal Bhai and others, : 1964 AIR (SC) 1006. The Supreme Court held: "It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus." And further: "Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art. 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Art. 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy. but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable."