MADAN SINGH Vs. LABOUR COURT, BHATINDA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Labour Court has held that the termination was not in order though it was justified. In order to reach a finding on justification, the Court has relied on a decision of this Court rendered on August 06, 1992 in CWP No.17628 of 1991 wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed as follows:-

(2.) The Labour Court has noticed that the management had complied with the provisions of section 25-F (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the Act") inasmuch as notice was served on the workman along payment of one month's wages in lieu of notice but pre-condition in section 25-F (b) of the Act was not complied with. On these premises, the Labour Court has held that no case for reinstatement is made out but there is according to it undoubtedly a case for other relief available in the form of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. However, in the view of this Court the Labour Court fell in error in failing to cull out the true ratio in the aforesaid writ petition and applied the ruling blindly to the facts of the present case. There was no evidence worthy of credit to hold that the termination was justified and this finding is in the nature of ipse dixit of the Labour Court and is, therefore, not sustainable in law.

(3.) The petitioner had worked as a Chowkidar in a godown maintained by the employer PUNSUP. In the written statement filed by the management it has been explained that due to shifting of wheat stock from the godown where the workman was employed for watch and ward duties the requirement of daily wage Chowkidars had fallen and more than one daily wage Chowkidar had to be retrenched on account of being rendered surplus. The retrenched workers were paid one month's pay in lieu of notice and compensation. This defence is primarily based on the deposition of Gurcharan Singh, Senior Assistant produced by the Management appearing as MW-1 the material part of which is recorded in para.7 of the award by the Labour Court where the sentence in its sense has been left incomplete by mistake. This Court has not had the benefit of reading Gurcharan Singh's testimony in full and, therefore, this Court has had to rely on the relevant part of the written statement to connect the missing part to draw the full meaning, as was pointed out by the learned counsel for PUNSUP.