LAWS(P&H)-2005-4-81

GURDIP SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

Decided On April 06, 2005
GURDIP SINGH Appellant
V/S
State of Punjab and Another Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner herein, while working as District Attorney (Prosecution) and posted at Ludhiana, was inflicted punishment of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect vide order dated March 25, 1994 (Annexure P-2), which is being impugned in this writ petition.

(2.) It appears that a State case titled as State v. Amarjit Singh, arising out of FIR No. 381 of 1989, Police Station Sadar Ludhiana, under Section 326 IPC, was being conducted by the petitioner on behalf of the State. An application was moved by Surinder Singh, complainant in the aforesaid case on 18.7.1992 (Annexure P-4) alleging that the petitioner was hobnobbing with the accused party. The said complaint was entrusted for preliminary enquiry to Shri H.P.S. Sidhu, Joint Director (Prosecution), who, vide a report bearing diary No. 9807 dated 25.8.1992, found the petitioner guilty of helping the accused-Amarjit Singh. It appears that the said preliminary enquiry report also revealed the reasons as to why the petitioner helped the said accused. Having accepted the said preliminary enquiry report and having drawn the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of helping the accused in the aforementioned case, a "show cause notice" under Rule 10 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 (for short 'the Rules of 1970') calling upon him as to why minor penalty as provided under Rule 5(i) to (iv) should not be imposed upon him, was issued. The petitioner responded to the said show cause notice vide his reply dated 29.12.1993, but the same, having not convinced the competent authority, impugned order dated 25.3.1994 (Annexure P-2) came to be passed. Aggrieved at the said order the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

(3.) Mr. Pawan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play; the impugned action was nothing but a colourable exercise of power inasmuch as the accused in the aforesaid case was convicted way back on 27.10.1992, i.e., much before the passing of the impugned order yet it has been projected as if the petitioner was helping the accused. Reference has been made to the averments made in para 2 of the writ petition wherein the petitioner had questioned some punitive administrative orders passed against him in the past, as according to him, he having challenged these orders, annoyed the authorities. He further points out that while issuing notice of motion, a Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 12.4.1994, though had suspended the operation of order, Annexure P-2, but the said interim stay was subsequently vacated while admitting the writ petition on 17.5.1994.