V P GUPTA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) "No man shall be a judge in his own cause", is a principle of law cherished by most of the legal systems, which are governed by the Rule of Law. The principle applies not only in cases where the judge is directly involved. It would apply with equal vigour where the judge has an interest in the outcome of the case. Interest of the judge is also not confined only to legal or pecuniary interest. It would apply also where the judge is likely to be biased. It was said by Bowen L.J. in the case of Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education, etc., (1889) 43 Ch.D. 366 at p.385, that "Judge like Caesar 's wife, should be above suspicion". It is to avoid such suspicion that the Courts have developed some cautionary principles which are popularly referred to as Rules of Natural Justice. The rule that likelihood of bias would disqualify a Judge was summed up by Lord Campbell C.J. in the case of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 3 H.L.Cases 759 at p.793 as follows: "No one can suppose that Lord Cotten -ham could be, in the remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had in this concern; but it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own cause should be held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest. Since I have had the honour to be Chief Justice of the Court of Queen 's Bench, we have again and again set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals because an individual, who had an interest in a cause, took part in the decision. And it will have a most salutary influence on these tribunals when it is known that this high court of last resort, in a case in which the Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that this decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and was set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an influence."

(2.) THE rule was reiterated by Lord Cave L.C. in the case of Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices, (1926) A.C. 586 at page 590, as follows; "If there is on principle which forms an integral part of the English law, it is that every member of a body engaged in a judicial proceeding must be held to act judicially; and it has been held over and over again that, if a member of such a body is subject to a bias, whether financial or other, in favour of or against either party to the dispute or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed he ought not to take part in the decision or even to sit upon the tribunal."

(3.) THE aforesaid statement of policy was confirmed by Lord Esher M.R. in the case of Eckersley v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Boards (1894) 2 Q.B. 667 at p.671, as follows: "..the doctrine which is applied to judges, not merely of the Superior Courts, but to all judges, that, not only must they be not biased, but that, even though it be demonstrated that they would not be biased, they ought not to act as judges in a matter where the circumstances are such that people not necessarily reasonable people, but many people would suspect them of being biased."