(1.) The solitary contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner while impugning the award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Amritsar (hereinafter referred to as the Labour Court), dated 26.11.1981, is that in view of the conclusion drawn by the Labour Court to the effect, that the termination of the services of the petitioner was in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), it was imperative for the Labour Court to award reinstatement and continuity in service with full back wages. It is pointed out, that the conclusion drawn by the Labour Court to the effect, that the position occupied by the petitioner prior to his reinstatement could not be granted to him, is an irrelevant consideration which could not have been taken note of while adjudicating upon the claim raised by the petitioner.
(2.) The first and foremost issue which arises for consideration before the claim of the petitioner can be accepted is, whether the determination by the Labour Court in the impugned award to the effect, that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner was in violation of Section 25-F of the Act, was justified. In so far as the instant issue is concerned, it is necessary to notice, that the petitioner was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk by the respondent-management on 5.7.1976 on a monthly wage of Rs. 378.50, for a period of six months only, on temporary and ad hoc basis. After the initial period of six months had expired, the petitioner was granted an extension in his employment in terms of the instructions issued by the Secretary of the Punjab State Electricity Board, dated 5.7.1976 (Ex. MW 1/4). Since the continuation of the petitioner-workman in the employment of the respondent-management was based on the aforesaid instructions dated 5.7.1976, it is imperative to accept that the terms and conditions expressed in the said instructions constituted a part and parcel of the terms and conditions of his continuation in service. It is not a matter of dispute that the instructions dated 5.7.1976 expressly envisaged that the services of those allowed appointment/extension thereunder, would be dispensed with on the induction of regular appointees. The facts depicted in the impugned award, especially paragraph 6 thereof clearly reveals, that one Rajinder Mohan Singh came to be appointed on a regular basis. On assumption of charge by the aforesaid Rajinder Mohan Singh, the services of the petitioner were terminated in terms of his contract of employment. It is, therefore, clear that the services of the petitioner came to be dispensed with in terms of his conditions of appointment/extension.
(3.) In so far as the factual position noticed above is concerned, the first issue to be examined is whether the action of the respondent-management in terminating the services of the petitioner-workman, can be treated as "retrenchment" from the employment of the respondent-management, within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. The term "retrenchment" has been defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act. Sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act delineates instances when termination of a workman would not constitute retrenchment. Keeping in mind Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, it is imperative to conclude that the termination of the petitioner-workman did not amount to retrenchment, as the same was in consonance with the terms and conditions of his appointment/extension.