PIARA LAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner joined the Punjab State Seeds Corporation in the year 1979 as a Cashier and while he was holding that appointment, FIR No. 110 dated 3.8.1987 under Section 409/467 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against him, alleging that during the period February, 1984 to July, 1987, he had committed a breach of trust for an amount of Rs, 1, 54, 000/-. The challan was put up in the Court on 10th April, 1989 and the charge was framed on 3rd of June of the same year. The case was fixed for the recording of the prosecution evidence on 3rd August, 1989, but no witness was examined on that day. As the trial was being inordinately delayed, the petitioner filed Cr. Misc. No. 64-65-M/1988 praying that the first information report be quashed on the ground of delay. This petition was dismissed on merits on 17th January, 1989. The petitioner thereafter filed Cr.Misc. 9439-M of 1993 praying for the same relief which too was dismissed by this court on the ground that the second application was res judicata of the first one. The present petition is the third one praying for the same relief but no (on ?) different grounds and in support of the argument that there was no question of res judicata in such matters, reliance has been placed on Thakkar Dass v. The State of Haryana, 1991(3) RCR 235.

(2.) NOTICE was issued on this petition and reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent. Mrs. Daya Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, has first urged on the basis of the judgment cited above that the question of res judicata would not be an obstacle in her way, as the present petition had been filed in view of the changed circumstances that even after the dismissal of the earlier two petitions, there has been no progress in the trial. On facts, she has urged that from a look at the reply filed by the respondent it was clear that the delay in the conduct of the trial had been primarily occasioned due to the fact that the lawyers remained on strike for long periods and that the record of the case had not been received by the Court.

(3.) ON the second question posed by Mrs. Daya Chaudhary, I, however, find that no case for interference is made out. It is, no doubt, true from a reading of the reply that there has been a very substantial delay in the conduct of the trial which commenced in June, 1989 and no evidence has so far been recorded but this delay has taken place not on account of any lapse on the part of the prosecuting agency but due to the lawyers (including the petitioner's counsel) strike for long periods and also because the record of the case was not received by the trial court. It is also apparent from a reading of the reply that some prosecution evidence in the shape of the witnesses was present in Court virtually on every date but the evidence could not be recorded for reasons beyond the control of the prosecution. In this view of the matter, Mrs. Chaudhary's argument that as the petitioner had been denied a speedy trial, Article 21 of the Constitution stood violated has got no meaning.