EICHER GOODEARTH LTD Vs. STATE OF HARYANA ETC

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner.

(2.) THE petitioner-company is a limited company in the name of M/s Eicher Goodearth limited and is having its unit called Eicher Research Centre at Ballabgarh in Faridabad district claims to be engaged in carrying on research work for Eicher Motors Ltd. and Eicher Tractors Ltd. for which it has been charging service charges for the service rendered in the form of research and development. The Company is stated to have entered into two agreements one with Eicher Motors Ltd. and the other with Eicher Tractors Ltd. for carrying on research work for the Company. In this petition, the main challenge is to the legality of Annexure P/17 on the ground of its being unjust and against the provisions of the law applicable in the case. In support of their case, the learned counsel for the petition-company has relied upon the judgment of, the Allahabad High Court in U. P. Lamination v. Union of India, 1985 (20) E. L. T. (Allahabad), and Shivarayana Laduram v. The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hyderabad, (1967)19 S. T. C. 50 and E. Krishnappa Naicker v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Tiruvannamalal, (1963)14 S. T. C. 162.

(3.) THE Supreme Court in 'assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India ltd. A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 330, has held that in exercise of the writ jurisdiction interim orders should not be passed at the asking of the party. Relying upon Titaghur Paper Mill's case (supra) the Court held: ". . . . That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is Only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. "