BANARSI DASS Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was appointed as Conductor by General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Yamuna Nagar, respondent No. 2 on August 21, 1987. His services were terminated on March 11, 1988 and an industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner-workman and the Labour Court gave its award on October 27, 1993 Annexure P.1, holding the termination to be legal and valid. This award is being impugned by the petitioner-workman in this writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner read to us the appointment letter, though the same was not filed with the petition. It clearly indicates that the petitioner was appointed purely on adhoc basis and his services could be terminated any time without any notice. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court has ignored the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly, the petitioner-workman has not put in 240 days of service that order of retrenchment could be held to be against the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. In order to attract the provisions of Section 25-G, it was first necessary to determine whether the order of removal of the petitioner is order of retrenchment, as defined in Section 2 (oo) which reads as under:-

(2.) After going through the definition of "retrenchment" as provided above, we find that the case of the petitioner will not be covered under the definition of "retrenchment" as his services had been terminated as no longer required under a stipulation in that behalf contained in the order of appointment, in view of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Suraj Parkash Bhandan v. Union of India, 1986 A.I.R. 958 to support his allegation that person junior to the petitioner was still retained and the order would be violative of the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment. On going through the case aforesaid, we find that the ratio cannot be applied to the case in hand. That was a case where on surplus age the services of the workman were terminated and the services of junior to be retained, gained importance. Present is not a case of that type that on account of surplus age the services of the petitioner were terminated. Present is a case where the order of termination has been passed simply in accordance with the terms of the appointment letter. This writ petition is therefore, dismissed in limine.