KULDIP SINGH GOSWAMI Vs. BACHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER No. 1 who is an Excise and Taxation Officer (Enforcement) Panchkula and petitioner No. 2, an M.A. Ph.D presently working as Head of Hindi Department in Government College for Women, Ludhiana, have filed the present petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of complaint dated 16.9.1992 pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar, under Sections 323, 324, 504, 506/34 IPC, and summoning order dated 16.2.1993 and also the subsequent proceedings taken in the said complaint.

(2.) IN brief, the facts as revealed in the pleadings and annexures to the petition are that one Bachan Lal son of Lachman Dass, alleging himself to be property dealer filed a complaint in the Court of Ilaqa Magistrate, Judicial P.S. 'A' Division, Amritsar, against the petitioners alleging therein that about two months back, both the petitioners had approached him for purchase of a plot at Amritsar. A fee of Rs. 500/- was paid by the petitioners to Bachan Lal who showed few plots to the petitioners. Petitioner No. 1 showed his interest in partly built house at Green Avenue, Amritsar. Bachan Lal apprised petitioner No. 1 that the property is involved in some litigation and he can have advice from the lawyers dealing with the case. On 13.9.1992 at about 3.30 p.m. petitioner No. 1 accompanied by his brother-in-law, Mukesh Arora, (petitioner No. 2) met the complainant and asked him to show the plots again. Again in the evening, petitioner No. 1 told that he has yet to meet the lawyers as they were not available, and that they will meet him early in the morning opposite bus stand near Sangam Cinema, Amritsar, as they have to leave early in the morning. Accordingly, the complainant went to the place fixed by petitioners at about 6 a.m. and the petitioners without any reasons, started abusing the complainant alleging that the complainant had given them wrong information. Petitioner No. 2 gave a filthy abuse in the name of mother and sister and started saying that the complainant is a cheat and told that the complainant should immediately return the amount. Complainant told him that it was agreed that these charges are for service and therefore, they are not entitled to the return of money. Petitioner No. 1 gave a stick blow on the back of the complainant, while petitioner No. 2 who was holding the petitioner and tried to throw him down, gave a fist blow on the chest of the complainant. Thus, it was stated in the complaint that the petitioners have committed offences under Sections 323, 324, 504, 506/34 IPC. On the basis of this complaint and on the statement made by one Kewal Krishan, Kamal Kumar and Sh. Chokar, petitioners were ordered to be summoned by the Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 16.2.1993 under Sections 323, 504/506/34 I.P.C. The complaint as well as the order of summoning is being sought to be quashed in the petition on the ground that the complaint has been filed by the complainant at the instance of one Ranbir Singh who happens to be a retired Dy. Superintendent of Police with whom litigation regarding ejectment from the house is pending in the court of Rent Controller. Petitioners have alleged that previous to this complaint, two more complaints were filed against petitioner No. 1; one at Faridkot and another at Amritsar. Both the complaints were dismissed as it was found by the Judicial Magistrates trying those complaints that the complaints were filed with an ulterior motive in order to harass petitioner No. 1.

(3.) AFTER hearing learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that the present petition deserves to be accepted and the complaint and the summoning order liable to be quashed. What emerges from the pleadings is that Ranbir Singh, retired D.S.P. is occupying the house belonging to petitioner No. 1. An ejectment petition against the tenant was filed which is pending decision before the Rent Controller. As the tenant had encroached upon the rear portion of the house, a suit for permanent injunction was filed in the court of Senior Sub Judge, Chandigarh, which was decreed in favour of petitioner No. 1. The sons of the tenant assaulted the family members of petitioner No. 1 and accordingly, a criminal case, FIR No. 53 dated 15.2.1990 was got registered in Police Station Central, Sector 17, Chandigarh, under Sections 323, 452, 506 IPC. The tenant had also filed various complaints against petitioner No. 1 with the Minister-in-Charge and Secretary to the Government, Excise and Taxation Department, Chandigarh, alleging scandalous allegations against petitioner No. 1. However, these complaints were ordered to be filed after enquiry. Thereafter, the tenant visited the office of petitioner No. 1 at Panipat and made imputations, on the basis of which, petitioner No. 1 was forced to lodge a complaint against the said tenant in the court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Panipat. The Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 2.3.1993 passed an order of conviction against the tenant, against which an appeal is pending in the court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Panipat. Since the tenant was convicted, he is alleged to have openly threatened the petitioners that he would implicate them in false cases at different places in the terrorist-affected areas, where various police officers were his colleagues. One such complaint was filed by one Surinder Singh son of Kehar Singh in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar, against the petitioners. That complaint too was filed under Sections 323, 324, 504, 506 IPC. The Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 11.7.1992 dismissed the complaint by holding that "no convincing evidence has been led as to why the accused had come to Amritsar and even if they had come to Amritsar from Chandigarh, for what purpose they had come to Amritsar and moreover, there was no occasion for them to go on the road near the Gurdwara, as alleged in the complaint, at about 5 p.m. All the injuries on the person of the complainant, proved in the M.L.R. are simple in nature for which the possibility of self suffering cannot be ruled out. It is the normal tendency of the persons at Amritsar to get some outsiders summoned in false complaints for some ulterior motive. (emphasis supplied). Again, one Amarjit Singh son of Hardip Singh, filed a complaint against petitioner No. 1 in the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridkot, under Sections 279, 427, 337, 504, 506 IPC. That complaint was also dismissed by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridkot, on 1.2.1993 observing that "the complainant has also not produced any evidence with regard to his going to village Pipli and purchasing of a buffalo there except for the oral statement made by him in this connection which has also gone uncorroborated. Eighthly, the complainant is a resident of Faridkot whereas the accused is a resident of Chandigarh. The complaint seems to have been filed with some ulterior motive to harass the complainant for some reason known to the complainant. The version of the complainant does not support to reason in any manner." Against order dated 1.2.1993, a revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. was preferred before the Addl. Sessions Judge, who vide his order dated 31.3.1994 dismissed the revision petition by observing that "it seems as if the complainant had filed this complaint to settle some old score with the complainant or on behalf of someone else behind the scene." In the complaint, it has been alleged by the complainant that petitioners No. 1 and 2 met him on 13.9.1992 and fixed the time of evening and thereafter, on 14.9.1992 assaulted him. However, petitioners No. 1 and 2 have denied this fact. Petitioner No. 1 being an Excise and Taxation Officer has attached a note recorded by him in the inspection note-book regarding inspection of Naval Talkies, Panipat, on 13.9.1992 along with his other colleagues, thereby showing that he was very much present at Panipat on 13.9.1992. He has also annexed with the petition a certificate showing that he was in his office at Panipat on 14.9.1992 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and decided as many as five cases on that date, thereby showing his presence at Panipat on 14.9.1992 also. He has attached copies of two of said five cases with the petition. As regards petitioner No. 2, he being Ph.D doctor and Head of the Department in Hindi in Government College for Women, Ludhiana, was contesting the Panjab University Senate elections stated for 13.9.1992 and, therefore, was busy in canvassing for votes in his favour at Ludhiana on that date. On 14.9.92, petitioner No. 2 was present in his college right at 8 a.m. and attended his classes. To this effect, he has attached with the petition a certificate issued by the Principal, Government College for Women, Ludhiana, that petitioner No. 2 attended the college on 14.9.1992 from 8 a.m. to 1-30 p.m. Both the petitioners are Class-I officers of the State of Haryana and State of Punjab, and the allegations made against them seem to be concocted and absurd. Petitioner No. 1 is resident of Panipat and Petitioner No. 2, resident of Ludhiana. It is beyond one's comprehension that both of them together would go to Amritsar and ask the complainant, who is alleging himself to be property dealer, to come to the bus-stand and for no rhyme and reasons give him beatings and that too with a hockey stick which petitioner No. 1 is alleged to have been carrying. I am not prepared to accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondent that at this stage, this Court cannot re-assess the material which was there before the Judicial Magistrate, on the basis of which petitioners were summoned. This Court has an ample power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a complaint where allegations made are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever conclude that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. In State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl.(1) SCC 335, the Supreme Court has exhaustively considered the limitations which a High Court has, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings at the stage of F.I.R. or complaint, with a view to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Two of the categories mentioned in the said judgment, where such powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised, are :