SOMA ALIAS SAHIB KAUR Vs. GURNAM SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision arises out or the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code). It would appear that Smt. Soma petitioner initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code against the opposite party by alleging that she is the widow of Kishna deceased, who was the khewatdar in the land in dispute and he was in possession of specific, khasra numbers and that after his death she became owner of his property. It was further alleged that the opposite party wanted to take forcible possession of the land, therefore. the land should be attached under Section 146 of the Code. On February 8, 1983, the learned Sub-Divisional Executive Magistrate, Thanesar, passed the usual order under Section 145 of the Code stating that there was apprehension of breach of peace over the land in dispute and consequently exercising his powers under Section 146 of the Code, attached the property in dispute and appointed the Naib-Tehsildar, Shahbad, as a receiver thereof. Gurnam Singh respondent went up in revision before the Court of Session and the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Kurukshetra, set aside the order of attachment passed by the Sub-Divisional Executive Magistrate, Thanesar, on the ground that the order dated February 8, 1983. attaching the land in dispute was a composite order and that the trial Magistrate had failed to consider if the present case was one of emergency.

(2.) SMT . Soma petitioner aggrieved with the said order, has filed the present revision in this Court. The learned counsel appearing on her behalf has argued that the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was illegal and that the same was based on conjectures and surmises without properly appreciating the facts of the case. It is further contended that the observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the trial Magistrate has nowhere mentioned in his order that it was a case of emergency, is factually wrong and that a bare perusal, of the order passed by the Magistrate would show that there was apprehension of imminent breach of peace and therefore, the order of attachment of the land in dispute was passed. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents' has contended that there was no material before the Magistrate for coming to the conclusion that there was any apprehension. of breach of peace and that the Magistrate could not pass a composite order under Section 146 of the Code.

(3.) APPLYING the aforesaid principle. the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Executive Magistrate, Thanesar, dated February 8, 1983 in the present case and the proceedings consequent thereto. are unassailable.