JOSEPH L. MALL Vs. PETTER GILL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition has been filed against the order dated 15.11.1983 of the learned Additional District Judge, Ropar partly accepting the appeal and declining the application for temporary injunction regarding the hall.

(2.) BRIEFLY , the case of the plaintiff petitioner is that he was in possession of a building marked as ABCDEF as a tenant under the United Church of Northern - India Trust Association. Later a hall in the same building was also given to him on rent by the said Association with effect from 11.11.1983. It is alleged that the defendant-respondents wanted to eject him forcibly from whole of building. Consequently, he filed a suit for injunction restraining the defendants to dispossess him from the building except in due course of law. He also filed an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for an-interim injunction to the same effect. It was contested by the respondents who controverted the allegations of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court caffie to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the property in dispute. Consequently, it granted an ad-interim injunction. The defendants went up in appeal before the Additional District Judge who partly accepted the appeal, modified the order of the trial Court and vacated the injunction with regard to the hall in the building in dispute.

(3.) I have given due consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel. I have also gone through the judgments of both the Courts below carefully. The learned trial Court at more than one place has categorically stated that the petitioner was in possession of the hall as a tenant. That finding has not been upset by the learned appellate court. It is well settled that if a person is admittedly in possession of a certain property, he cannot be dispossessed therefrom except in due course of law-see Sadhu Ram v. Gram Panchayat, Pastana, 1984 PLJ 217. The facts in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (supra) are distinguishable. In that case the trial Court and the lower appellate court refused to issued ad-interim injunction restraining the corporation from realising the amount of house-tax. That finding was upset in revision by the High Court. The above facts show that the case is distinguishable. In my view, Mr. Sehgal cannot derive any benefit from the observations made therein.