MANGE RAM Vs. CHANDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition against the order dated March 25, 1983, of the Additional District Judge, Sonepat, deserves to succeed.

(2.) Mange Ram plaintiff-petitioner brought a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from dispossessing him forcibly from the land in dispute. This suit was filed on the allegation that the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the land and the defendants having no right or interest in the same are endeaveouring to dispossess him forcibly. Along with the suit the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing him from the disputed land during the pendency of the suit. This application was contested by the defendants. However, the trial Court held that from the revenue entries incorporated in the latest jamabandi as also in the up-to-date Khasra Girdawaris the plaintiff is found to be in possession of the suit land and in such circumstances temporary injunction was issued against the defendants restraining them from dispossessing the plaintiff till the decision of the suit. This order was challenged by the defendants in appeal which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat, vide the impugned order.

(3.) It is not disputed that according to the revenue entries the petitioner is in possession of the land in dispute. His possession is entered not only in the up-to-date Khasra Girdawaris but also in the latest Jamabandi. The learned trial Court had, therefore, taken a correct view that prima facie the petitioner is in possession of the land. In appeal this view was erroneously dislodged by the appellate Court. In reversing the order of the trial Court the learned appellate Court noticed an order dated January 30, 1978 of the Assistant Collector, Sonepat, to come to a conclusion that the petitioner was out of possession and actually the defendants were occupying the land. It probably escaped the notice of the learned appellate Court that the petitioner was not a party to that order and as such no reliance could be placed on that order at this stage to reverse a well-reasoned order of the trial Court. Placing reliance on the said order of the Assistant Collector at the present stage of litigation would mean deciding the suit on merits without hearing the plaintiff. It is, therefore, manifest that this order could not take precedence over the entries in the revenue record which indicate that prima facie the petitioner is in possession of the land in dispute. I am, therefore, of the view that the appellate Court has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity. Evidently the impugned order, if allowed to stand, would cause irreparable injury to the petitioner because under the garb of the impugned order the defendants would be able to dispossess the petitioner forcibly.